The Sewing Machine | Aman Mirzai (Poem)

Aman Mirzai was born in Mashhad, Iran, in 1985, to a family of refugees from Mazar-e Sharif in Afghanistan. He has been writing poetry for seven years, and has won awards in many nationwide poetry competitions in Iran. He has published one collection of poetry, Giah-e Sukhte [The Burnt Plant].

He is currently a student of public relations in Mashhad, and an active member of the Dorr-e Dari Cultural Center, the foremost literary organization among Afghan refugees in Mashhad.




The Sewing Machine

The sewing machine’s quiet hum
was my mother’s sad song.
At my father’s stall
it was her peasant trousers
that could send me to school
answer the landlord
and buy medicine.
My sister Marzieh, whose illness nobody understands,
and cannot be cured even in the shrine,
coughs continuously
like the sewing machine’s needle
and the softness of her bones
only feeds the earth’s lust.
Mother is the needle’s thread:
with Marzieh’s every cough,
with every breath her heartstrings rend.
Father doesn’t close his stall even in the rain
and I, in a place where nobody goes,
talk to myself.
The clever people in the newspapers
write articles about us,
while my countrymen
have forgotten the pleasures of the spring festival of Mazar.
Mother is the sewing machine’s foot at night:
she trembles.
Father is the doorframe
closed into himself.
A pot of bitter tea;
in the photo album Marzieh gently laughs
and I think about everything.




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America’s Costly War Machine | Stiglitz & Bilmes

The article below was in the Los Angeles Times yesterday. I have linked it to the graphic above that appeared in yesterdays New York Times in a piece entitled The Impoverished States of America.


America’s Costly War Machine | Stiglitz & Bilmes

Ten years into the war on terror, the U.S. has largely succeeded in its attempts to destabilize Al Qaeda and eliminate its leaders. But the cost has been enormous, and our decisions about how to finance it have profoundly damaged the U.S. economy.

Many of these costs were unnecessary. We chose to fight in Iraq and Afghanistan with a small, all-volunteer force, and we supplemented the military presence with a heavy reliance on civilian contractors. These decisions not only placed enormous strain on the troops but dramatically pushed up costs. Recent congressional investigations have shown that roughly 1 of every 4 dollars spent on wartime contracting was wasted or misspent.

To date, the United States has spent more than $2.5 trillion on the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Pentagon spending spree that accompanied it and a battery of new homeland security measures instituted after Sept. 11.

How have we paid for this? Entirely through borrowing. Spending on the wars and on added security at home has accounted for more than one-quarter of the total increase in U.S. government debt since 2001. And not only did we fail to pay as we went for the wars, the George W. Bush administration also successfully pushed to cut taxes in 2001 and again in 2003, which added further to the debt. This toxic combination of lower revenues and higher spending has brought the country to its current political stalemate.

There is only one other time in U.S. history that a war was financed entirely through borrowing, without raising taxes: when the Colonies borrowed from France during the Revolutionary War.

Even if we were to leave Afghanistan and Iraq tomorrow, our war debt would continue to rise for decades. Future bills will include such things as caring for military veterans, replacing military equipment, rebuilding the armed forces and paying interest on all the money we have borrowed. And these costs won't be insignificant.

History has shown that the cost of caring for military veterans peaks decades after a conflict. Already, half of the returning troops have been treated in Veterans Administration medical centers, and more than 600,000 have qualified to receive disability compensation. At this point, the bill for future medical and disability benefits is estimated at $600 billion to $900 billion, but the number will almost surely grow as hundreds of thousands of troops still deployed abroad return home.

And it isn't just in some theoretical future that the wars will affect the nation's economy: They already have. The conditions that precipitated the financial crisis in 2008 were shaped in part by the war on terror. The invasion of Iraq and the resulting instability in the Persian Gulf were among the factors that pushed oil prices up from about $30 a barrel in 2003 to historic highs five years later, peaking at $140 a barrel in current dollars in 2008. Higher oil prices threatened to depress U.S. economic activity, prompting the Federal Reserve to lower interest rates and loosen regulations. These policies were major contributors to the housing bubble and the financial collapse that followed.

Now, the war's huge deficits are shaping the economic debate, and they could keep Congress from enacting another round of needed stimulus spending to help the country climb out of its economic malaise. Many of these war debts are likely to continue to compromise America's investments in its future for decades.

For years, the public failed to adequately question how it was possible that we could spend and borrow so freely, with so few consequences. But now the painful legacy of these decisions has become clear. Throughout the past decade, Congress routinely approved huge "emergency" appropriations to pay for the wars. This process preempted the usual scrutiny and debate that accompanies large spending bills. In part, this is because the U.S. lacks the basic accounting tools necessary for informed debate. Our future debts from the war are not listed anywhere in the federal government's budget. We don't even know for certain where the money has been spent. The Pentagon hasn't produced a clean financial audit in the 20 years since government auditing began, nor has it developed an accounting framework that would allow an assessment of the future costs of current decisions. This has almost certainly increased the overall cost of the war.

Our response to Sept. 11 has weakened both the current economy and our future economic prospects. And that legacy of economic weakness — combined with the erosion of the credibility of our military power and of our "soft power" — has undermined, rather than strengthened, our national security.

Nearly 10 years into the Afghanistan war, the violence in that country shows little sign of abating. August was the deadliest month of the war yet for U.S. troops, and there were also multiple attacks on Afghan security forces, government officials and civilians. The surge in violence comes as NATO is drawing down and handing over security control to national forces. But tens of thousands of U.S. military personnel are scheduled to remain in Afghanistan through the end of 2014.

The costs of fighting the war on terror have already been far higher than they needed to be. The U.S. should not take on even greater war debt without understanding the true costs of continuing down that path.

Linda J. Bilmes is a faculty member at Harvard University. Joseph E. Stiglitz is a professor at Columbia University and the recipient of the Nobel Prize in economics. They are coauthors of "The Three Trillion Dollar War: The True Cost of the Iraq Conflict."

Afghan Video Shorts | Fakhria Ibrahimi

From the inside of a community-based bakery, an unusual view of the daily lives of Afghan women is revealed – unveiled and uninhibited. It is a rare opportunity to see the collective action that is so key to Afghan life. Full version 11 minutes.

TREASURE TROVE

Treasure Trove - Full Version.

Direction, Camera and Sound by Fakhria Ibrahimi
Editing by Rahmatullah Jafari

Fakhria Ibrahimi lives in Kabul and is from Wardack province. She has worked on community-based documentary photography projects in Sari Pul province. Fakhria is also a Kabul-based representative for the Funder’s Network for Afghan Women.

The View from Within | Writing From Afghanistan

Guest Editor: Anders Widmark

In a discussion at the House of Culture in Stockholm just over a week ago, the Afghan writer Atiq Rahimi, having summarized the last three decades of Afghan history, concluded laconically that the present state was: “un chaos total”—a total chaos. Rahimi is far from alone in his assessment, but he is unusual in that he speaks to the situation as an Afghan, rather than an outside observer. It is the “chaos” this issue has tried to put in words—this time voiced from within.

From within I say, and this is important. Much of what is said and written about Afghanistan in the West today is still tainted by an outside perspective on the situation—a narrative that keeps repeating and reformulating earlier misconceptions and generalizations. With regard to the ongoing conflict, it is completely incomprehensible to me, even as a layman in the field, that policy-makers on Afghanistan have failed so utterly in understanding this country after a decade of interference. No one seems to listen to the people. No one seems to hear what they are saying or read what they are writing.

Contemporary Afghan literature rests upon a rich heritage of both oral and written traditions. The two major languages of Afghanistan, Pashto and Dari, with approximately sixty million speakers altogether (including those outside Afghanistan), possess a wealth of literature, unfortunately mostly unstudied, marginalized, and known to few. Hopefully, this issue on Afghan writing will help to introduce its treasures to a broader public.

Talking about Afghan literature, you are often forced into a discussion on politics. In a “poeticized community” such as Afghanistan, much of what is written, especially poetry, is in one way or another related to politics; not necessarily being political or ideological, but politicized to various degrees. This will be seen clearly in the texts selected for this issue. Much of the country’s history is channeled through literature; in both written and oral literature, in the canonical as well as in the noncanonical, in the past and in the present. When one considering the nature of poetry and fiction produced over the last three decades of war and conflict this becomes clear. What is also interesting and can be said to epitomize Afghan literature of today, is its high degree of responsiveness and immediacy—in many other literatures a national trauma often demands some sort of “incubation period” before the topic can be processed; in Afghanistan, traumas are attacked by the pen simultaneously as they occur. “The Idol’s Dust” by Zalmay Babakohi, as an example, was written only a month after the destruction of the Bamiyan statues in March 2001.

To finish the introduction click here.

Full Issue: Writing from Afghanistan

Attacks on US Embassy in Kabul | Fear and Panic

An Afghan military helicopter fires on a building occupied by 'insurgents' during a coordinated assault in Kabul. Insurgents fired rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles at the U.S. Embassy and NATO headquarters while suicide bombers struck police buildings. (AP/Musadeq Sadeq)



Jack Healy and Alissa J. Rubin had a couple of articles this week on the coordinated attacks in Kabul. In addition to following the US governments position on those responsible, I noticed they used these quotes a couple of times. Highlighting the different ways Afghans and foreigners see the violence.

To summarize.

The residents of Kabul are mad and afraid, the US Ambassador down-played the violence saying it is a sign of weakness and the new US NATO commander revealed who was responsible and their motives.

“We are mad at both,” said Farid Hotak. “At the Taliban for doing these types of attacks, and at the government for failing to prevent them.” Mr. Hotak, who lives in an apartment across the street, seethed at the memory of girls crying and running for cover. “Fear and panic rules,” he said. - Afghan Resident of Kabul

Ryan C. Crocker, played down the attack as “harassment” that had made for a hard day at the embassy but was not a game-changer. “This really is not a very big deal,” Mr. Crocker said. “If that’s the best they can do, you know, I think it’s actually a statement of their weakness.” - US Ambassador

“The Haqqanis have been attacking Kabul for a long time because Kabul for so much of this country represents not just the spiritual heartland of this country, it represents the future,” General Allen said at a briefing. - US and NATO Commander

A more detailed account of the day is provided by Fabrizio Foschini, focusing more on the Afghan targets that were hit and the impact it had on the residents. The timeline from Associated Press affirms increasing levels of violence in the city.

Another Longest Day in Kabul

Starting close after 1pm, at least three major attacks rocked a beautiful late summer day in Kabul.

“The objective of the attacks seems clear. The two explosions in West Kabul targeted the Afghan Border Police (ABP) headquarters in Deh Mazang and Afghan National Police (ANP) 202 Shamshad corps headquarters on Darulaman road, near Lycee Habibia. Some police casualties were reported for both attacks, which were apparently suicide bombings (one ANP and two ABP respectively, plus an unknown number of injured civilians and servicemen). As for the complex attack that lasted for most of the afternoon and into the evening, its real dynamics and details are still all but clear. The ultimate target of the commando could have been any (or all) of the locations mentioned in the Taleban statement, that said its fighters ‘attacked the NATO’s ISAF HQ, US embassy and local and foreign intelligence agencies’. At least three rockets are said to have hit close to the US embassy compound, while at least one (unconfirmed) report points at insurgent attempts to breach the embassy's outer security perimeter from different points (this matches other equally unconfirmed reports of more insurgents moving in the area, apart from those barricaded in the building under construction).

Be as it is, a Taleban attack inside Kabul in itself did not come as a big surprise, although its intensity and scope was unexpected. According to a generally accepted interpretation, the pattern of insurgent attacks inside Kabul has reached a frequency of around one attack in every three weeks. Special occasions or events can further add to this number. The present situation, with the anniversaries of last week, accounted for both eventualities, and many were waiting in trepidation for something to happen.”

Timeline| Recent Attacks in Kabul


2011

—Sept. 13: Taliban insurgents fire rocket-propelled grenades and assault rifles at the U.S. Embassy, NATO headquarters and other buildings.

—Aug. 19: Taliban suicide bombers storm the British Council, an international charity, killing eight people during an eight-hour firefight as two English language teachers and their bodyguard hid in a locked panic room.

—July 17: Gunmen strapped with explosives kill a close adviser to President Hamid Karzai and a member of parliament. Jan Mohammed Khan was an adviser to Karzai on tribal issues and was close to the president, a fellow Pashtun.

—June 29 — Nine insurgents armed with bomb vests, rifles and rocket launchers storm the Inter-Continental Hotel, killing at least 12 people and holding off NATO and Afghan forces for five hours.

—June 18: Insurgents wearing Afghan army uniforms storm a police station near the presidential palace and open fire on officers, killing nine.

—May 21: A suicide bomber wearing an Afghan soldier uniform slips inside the main military hospital in Kabul and kills six Afghan medical students.

—April 27: A veteran Afghan military pilot opens fire at the Kabul airport, killing eight U.S. troops and an American civilian contractor.

—April 18: A suicide attacker sneaks past security at the Afghan Defense Ministry, killing two Afghan soldiers and fatally wounding an Afghan army officer.

—Feb. 14: A suicide bomber attacks Kabul's first Western-style shopping mall, killing two security guards at the entrance.

—Jan. 28: A suicide bomber attacks inside a Western-style supermarket, killing eight.

—Jan. 12: A suicide bomber on a motorbike targets a minibus carrying Afghan intelligence employees, killing at least two and wounding more than 30.


2010


—Dec. 19: Two insurgents strapped with explosives ambush a bus carrying Afghan army officers to work, killing five and wounding nine.

—Nov. 12: A suicide attacker strikes an American convoy, killing one civilian.

—Aug. 10: Two suicide bombers attack a private security company building, killing two company drivers.

—June 2: Insurgents fire rockets at the site of a national peace conference, where Taliban fighters wearing suicide vests battle security forces. Two militants are killed.

—May 18: A Taliban suicide bomber attacks a NATO convoy, killing 18 people including five American troops and a Canadian soldier.

—April 19: An explosion at an Afghan National Army facility just outside the capital kills an American soldier.

—Feb. 26: Suicide attackers strike two residential hotels, killing 20 people, including seven Indians.

—Jan. 26: A suicide car bomber strikes a barrier outside a U.S. base in Kabul, wounding six Afghans and eight American troops.

—Jan. 18: A team of suicide bombers and gunmen target government buildings, leaving 12 dead, including seven attackers.

The True Cost of War | Tony Benn & Brian Eno

An inspiring graphic-driven call to action from our friends in the UK.

Substitute dollars for pounds and this is our story too. However, to realize the cost in the US, the figure should be increased ten-fold.

For every British soldier in Afghanistan there are ten US soldiers.

Five Paradoxes of Peace Operations | Richard Gowan

In February 2011, United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon told an audience at Oxford University that, with 120,000 uniformed and civilian peacekeepers worldwide, “we are now considering what the optimal size of UN peacekeeping should be.” But peace operations are rarely shaped by objective considerations. UN and non-UN missions are plagued by contradictory pressures. From Haiti to Sudan, there are compelling arguments for maintaining large peacekeeping forces for the long term. But there are equally powerful financial and political reasons to cut them back.


There is no shortage of policy papers offering technical recommendations about how to reform peacekeeping. This paper takes a different approach, setting out five paradoxes that currently trouble officials dealing with peacekeeping at the UN, in governments and in organizations such as NATO, the European Union (EU) and the African Union (AU). The evolution of peacekeeping will depend on how policy-makers respond to these dilemmas.

Full article

The Paradoxes

Military peacekeeping has grown in scale … yet lost operational impact.

Peacekeeping is cheap … but it is also still too expensive.

All peace operations are political … but not all are guided by credible political strategies and few peacekeepers are good at politics.

Peacekeepers promote democracy and justice … but democracy and justice don’t always promote peace.

Emerging non-Western powers play a major role in peacekeeping … but may not want it.