The Path Forward | Day two of the Jirga

The best way to acknowledge the millions and millions of war widows, orphans, and displaced is to end this war. Helping people meet basic needs should be seen as an obligation and a strategic priority, not an act of charity.

Instead, the US is making threats and ultimatums. Demanding a quick decision that endorses a militarized super-structure focusing more on US goals than Afghan needs by asking…

How many US troops will be in the country?
What will be their role as advisers and enablers to Afghan forces?
Will they be allowed to conduct night raids and detain people?
Will they have immunity from Afghan law?
What type of weapons systems should we provide?
Can they attack bordering countries from Afghanistan?
Will they be obliged to respond to attacks from bordering countries?

Photo from UNICEF – Afghanistan

The Jirga and the Bilateral Security Agreement

Yesterday it was announced that the Governments of Afghanistan and the United States reached an agreement to keep US troops - and massive military aid - in the country until 2024. The agreement must first be affirmed by a Loya Jirga and then the Afghan Parliament. Details from day one.

The challenges facing Afghan civil society to overcome militarism will be daunting. Over the past few years far-reaching partnerships, arrangements and designations have sought to use military aid, training, and equipment to build up government security forces in order to define the transition period (2014 – 2024). Far fewer resources are being invested in strategies that can begin to address root causes.


Instead of soldiers, armed contractors, and covert action what if we supported peace-building, reconciliation and healing?

An Afghan protester holds a banner reading "Signing Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the USA is a treason" at the loya jirga, a meeting of Afghan elders, in Kabul on November 21, 2013 (AFP Photo/Massoud Hossaini)


For Afghan alternatives look at the sites below.

Project 50 | Portraits – People – Lifestyle – Arts

Our man in Kabul

Afghanistan: Its people and daily life through pictures

Missing from the today’s commentary is the militarized super-structure that the US is funding. Afghans deserve better.

Afghanistan National Security Forces (30 September 2013)
176,818 - Afghan National Army
153,153 - Afghan National Police
6.616 - Afghan Air force
TOTAL 336,587

Afghan Special Forces
24,286 Afghan Local Police (Trained by US Special-Forces)
19,612 Afghan Public Protection (to replace private armed contractors)
TOTAL 43,898

US Military and Contractors
64,000 - Troops Deployed in Afghanistan (September 2013)
85,528 - DoD Contractors (October 2013)
14,056 - DoD Private (October 2013)
TOTAL 163,584

Total Forces: 544,069

Number of US Troops from SIGAR
Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Afghan Security Forces from SIGAR

The Bilateral Security Agreement | Troop Levels | Immunity

Kate Clark has details on the recently completed framework for a Bilateral Security Agreement.

The agreement will guide the future of the US presence in Afghanistan, detailing the number of bases, night-raids, air assaults, detention of prisoners, provision of arms, aid and training.

The key unresolved issue for the U.S. is troop immunity from Afghan courts after 2014.

The critical decision is to be made by a convention of Afghan political and tribal factions next month.

Image by Reza Sepehri

The challenges facing Afghan civil society to overcome militarism will be daunting. Over the past few years far-reaching partnerships, arrangements and designations have sought to use military aid, training, and equipment to build up government security forces in order to define the transition period (2014 – 2024). Far fewer resources are being invested in strategies that can begin to address root causes.

Enduring Strategic Partnership (2 May 2012)
U.S. - Afghanistan

Declaration on Afghanistan (22 May 2012)
NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF)

US Designates Afghanistan Major Non-NATO Ally (6 July 2012)

So, what is the current number of US and Afghan forces currently deployed and funded?

The answer may surprise you.

The office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released the most recent mandated quarterly report in July. With access to all official agencies involved with the war, it is one of the most authoritative reports available to the public.

The Special Inspector report is used to document the total number of US troops and Afghan National Security Forces. The figure for contractors comes from CENTCOM and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. (News reports indicate that since July 12,000 US troops have been removed from Afghanistan).

Here is the breakdown

Afghanistan National Security Forces
Afghan Army 178,826
Afghan Police 151,824
Afghan Air force 6,461
TOTAL 337,111

Afghan Special Forces
Afghan Local Police 23,551 (Trained by US Special-Forces)
Afghan Public Protection 18,821
TOTAL 42,372

US Military and Contractors
US Forces 70,100
DoD Contractors 101,855
DoD Private 16,218
TOTAL 188,173

Total Forces: 567,656

Number of US Troops from SIGAR
Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Afghan Security Forces from SIGAR

The question and challenge for Afghans is this.

What does sovereignty look like in a country where tens of thousands of foreign troops are on the ground, foreign governments pay for almost all the police and army, and 60 to 80 per cent of the government’s budget is dependent on foreign assistance?

Suicides Outnumber Battlefield Deaths for July

click on image to activate

Last month witnessed a record number of suicides in the U.S. military. In fact, more soldiers took their own lives then died on the battlefield. The interactive graphic above was published in June by Time.

Rebecca Burns writing for In These Times has a powerful profile entitled ‘Suicide is Anything but Painless.’ She features the field organizer Maggie Martin from Iraq Veterans Against War.

Yesterday the New York Times ran graphics and pictures to acknowledge that the death toll for US forces in and around Afghanistan had passed 2,000.

The average age is 26.

More detailed graphics here.

The Invisible Wounds of War: Coming Home from Iraq and Afghanistan

“The month of July set a record high for the number of suicides in the U.S. military. An Army report reveals a total of 38 troops committed suicide last month, including 26 active-duty soldiers and 12 Army National Guard or reserve members — more soldiers than were killed on the battlefield. The reasons for the increase in suicides are not fully understood. Among explanations, studies point to combat exposure, post-traumatic stress, misuse of prescription medications and personal financial problems.

Army data suggest soldiers with multiple combat tours are at greater risk of committing suicide. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta addressed the issue in June at the annual conference on suicide prevention in the military, saying, "Despite the increased efforts, the increased attention, the trends continue to move in a troubling and tragic direction." We speak with Marguerite Guzmán Bouvard, whose new book is called, "The Invisible Wounds of War: Coming Home from Iraq and Afghanistan."”

- Democracy Now 21 August 2012

The Numbers | Troops and Contractors | July 2012

For decades outside powers have intervened and occupied Afghanistan. The commitment of the international community to arm different groups is one reason the conflict has been so deadly for so long.

What is the current number of US and Afghan forces currently deployed and funded?

The answer may surprise you.

The combined forces - paid for by the US - is 567,655.

The office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released their mandated quarterly report yesterday. With access to all official agencies involved with the war, it is one of the most authoritative reports available to the public.

The Special Inspector report is used to document the total number of US troops and Afghan National Security Forces. The figure for contractors comes from CENTCOM and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Here is the breakdown.

Afghanistan National Security Forces
191,592 – Afghan National Army (May 2012)
146,641 – Afghan National Police (June 2012)
Total – 338,233

US Military and Contractors

87,000 – Troops Deployed in Afghanistan (June 2012)
113,736 – Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors (July 2012)
28,686 – DoD Private Security – does not include USAID and State (July 2012)

Total – 229,422


Number of US Troops from SIGAR
Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Afghan Security Forces from SIGAR

Two additional points from the special inspector report.

The goal is to build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 352,000 and then reduce the force to 228,500 by 2017. The Government of Afghanistan is scheduled to contribute $500 million by 2015. That represents less than 10% of the cost.

“The United States is covering most of the costs of the ANA (and provides a substantial amount for the ANP. The NATO Summit joint communiqué stipulates that the Afghan government will contribute $500 million in 2015 toward the sustainment of its security forces and gradually increase its share of the ANSF costs until 2024, when it will have full financial responsibility for its security forces.”

On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed the order making Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally. That makes it eligible for U.S. training, loans of equipment for research and development, and foreign military financing.

Regional Summit Addresses Impact of War

Yesterday the government of Afghanistan hosted representatives from 14 countries in the region to address the impact of three decades of war. The gathering focused on refugees, economic development, drug-trafficking and terrorism.



In addition to Iran, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia, participants at the conference included Russia, China, India, Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and the United Arab Emirates.

Representatives of 15 mostly Western countries and a dozen regional and international organizations also attended as observers. They included the United States, Britain, Germany, the United Nations, the European Union, and NATO.

Below is a report from the Associated Press.

“KABUL - Afghanistan and regional heavyweights have agreed to work together to fight terrorism and drug-trafficking and pursue economic development — a formidable agenda in a neighbourhood fraught with power struggles and rivalries.

On Thursday, the Afghan government played host to 14 other countries in the region, a peculiar role for a nation at war for more than three decades.

The issues they discussed were not new. What is new is that these countries agreed to work as a team to solve common problems. The hope is that regional co-operation will build confidence and erode decades of mistrust. And that, in turn, could help foster stability and greater prosperity.

"Afghanistan recognizes out of a grim experience of the past that it is only in stability and harmony and peace in this region that Afghanistan can prosper and be stable," President Hamid Karzai said in his opening remarks.

The conference, held under heavy security in Kabul, was a follow-up to the first "Heart of Asia" meeting held in November in Istanbul.

Both sessions took place after the U.S.-led NATO coalition decided to end its combat mission in Afghanistan by the close of 2014. While that deadline likely hastened work to foster more regional co-operation, the meetings are more of a recognition that an unstable Afghanistan threatens the entire region.

"Whatever happens in Afghanistan affects us in one way or another," said Ahmet Davutoglu, foreign minister of Turkey and co-chairman of the event.

"In order to build confidence, one needs to commit to working together, to leave past negative memories behind and positively reconstruct future expectations."

The 15 nations that participated in the conference were: Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan. Representatives of 15 other countries, most of them Western, and a dozen regional and international organizations also attended.

Rivalries abound.

Pakistan and India, for instance, have fought three major wars since the two were carved out of British India in 1947. India and Afghanistan recently signed a strategic partnership agreement, adding to concerns in Islamabad that New Delhi was increasing its influence on Pakistan's western flank. Iran feels threatened by any long-term presence of U.S. troops in Afghanistan and rivals Saudi Arabia for domination of the Persian Gulf.

Enhanced co-operation could also stall over an inability to find a political resolution to the Afghan war.

The Taliban have been willing to hold discussions with the United States but have rejected talks with the Afghan government — though Karzai insists that Taliban leaders have spoken with his government in private. The Taliban have announced their intent to open an office in Qatar. Karzai has backed that plan, but has been pushing Saudi Arabia as a venue for any possible talks.

Karzai announced at the conference that Salahuddin Rabbani, the head of the high peace council, would visit Saudi Arabia and Pakistan in the near future. Rabbani is the son of former Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who was killed in September 2011 by a suicide bomber posing as a peace emissary from the Taliban.

At the Istanbul conference, the nations identified more than 40 steps that could be taken to build confidence in the region. On Thursday, they agreed to:

—Improve the exchange of information about commercial opportunities and trade conditions; enhance co-operation among chambers of commerce; and develop a strategy to develop interconnecting infrastructure across the region — with support from international partners.
—Broaden co-operation and exchanges in the fields of education and science.
—Develop joint plans for disaster management.
—Counter the production, trafficking and consumption of opium, other narcotic drugs.
—Work together to fight terrorism.

The conference communique states that terrorism and violent extremism must be addressed in all their forms, "including the dismantling of terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens, as well as disrupting all financial and tactical support for terrorism."

This issue is aimed at Iran and Pakistan, which have been accused of not doing enough to counter militancy, or secretly facilitating it.

Iran has denied allegations that it provides financial support to militants.

Pakistan also bristles at allegations that it gives sanctuary to insurgents who attack Afghan and foreign forces across the border.

"If I believe that my future prosperity is linked with Afghans, then how can someone who is harming Afghanistan not be harming me?" Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar asked reporters, rhetorically, at a news conference after the conference.

Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Salehi expressed support for regional co-operation, especially on drug-trafficking, but used his speech to criticize the U.S.-led military coalition. He said the presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan has worsened security and led to a surge in narcotic drug production and trafficking.

The Iranian said "a particular country" intends to prolong its military presence in Afghanistan in "pursuit of its extra-regional objectives." It was clear that he was referring to the United States, which plans to keep some troops in Afghanistan after 2014 to train Afghan forces and battle terrorism.

In the spirit of co-operation, however, Iran agreed to lead the education initiative — and the United States and Australia signed up to work on that issue too.

Kazakhstan has agreed to host the group's third meeting in the first half of next year in Astana.”

The Strategic Partnership | Documents, Analysis, Action

President Barack Obama and President Hamid Karzai emerge from their meeting before signing a strategic partnership agreement at the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghanistan, Wednesday, May 2, 2012. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)

Linked below are some of the documents released by the White House.

The Agreement covers a ten-year period with a comprehensive commitment to aid, economy, education, justice and war. However, because it is a framework, there is a lack of detail on all these matters.

One thing is clear.

The commitment to military aid and building-up the security forces is guaranteed. The commitment to aid, education and justice is a pledge to ask Congress to appropriate the funds.

Kate Clark, Afghanistan Analysts Network offers this

“4) This is not a status of forces agreement - or ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’ as it is termed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement. That should come, the Agreement says, in a year’s time. This is by far the more important issue, as the US needs its forces to continue to enjoy immunity from the Afghan justice system for any crimes they commit on Afghan soil. Sorting out this issue has been made more urgent after many Afghans, including parliamentarians, demanded that those responsible for the Panjway killing spree and the Quran burning at Bagram had to be tried in Afghan courts. Whether or not a status of forces agreement is signed will ultimately decide whether US forces can stay or, as in Iraq, go.

5) However, as it stands, Afghanistan agrees to provide US forces with continued access to and use of Afghan facilities to the end of 2014 and beyond (as it may be agreed in the ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’) for the purposes of, ‘combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates, training the ANSF and other mutually determined missions to advance shared security interests.’ Or as Obama put it in his speech: there will be ‘two narrow security missions beyond 2014: counter-terrorism and continued training.’ The aim, he says, is to destroy al-Qaida, not to build a country in America’s image. It seems then that the mission is not about nation building. Yet this is completely at odds with most of the Strategic Partnership Agreement which does very much focus on nation building and with an agenda which looks, despite its repeated commitments to internationally accepted norms, not much as that of the Afghan government in practice.”

Official Documents:

Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement | Public Version

White House Fact Sheet on the Agreement

President’s Address to the Nation from Afghanistan


AFSC Response:

Newsletter: What will lead to a just and lasting peace in Afghanistan?

Our strategy is to challenge the media message with a public letter campaign, please help us. Click on the link to be directed to the action center.

Letter to the Editor

“After the President's speech Tuesday night, some might be under the impression that the war in Afghanistan is ending. On the contrary.

The plan that Mr. Obama announced just relies upon different military solutions, rather than peaceful alternatives for the Afghan people.

Under this plan Afghanistan will become a major non-NATO ally, subjecting the people of Afghanistan to yet another military alliance and continuing the last three decades of war and instability. The peace building necessary for a sovereign and stable Afghanistan cannot be carried out by the generals meeting later this month in Chicago for the NATO Summit.

Instead, we need to support a regional solution that doesn’t rely on force. Afghans don't want more wars and bigger armies. They want a settlement that heals a nation, instead of arming it. And so do many Americans.”

Troops and Contractors in Afghanistan | March 2012

On Sunday it was announced that the United States and Afghanistan had agreed to the framework of a Strategic Partnership Agreement. The document has not been made public but we know it commits the United States to a lasting presence in Afghanistan through at least 2024.

In the U.S., it will by-pass congressional oversight and simply needs the signature of President Obama. In Afghanistan, Parliamentary hearings began on Monday but it is unclear whether or not they need to 'approve' the treaty or if it moves forward with the signature of President Karzai.

"What I understand is what it's like to be in a war zone and I understand the behavior in a war zone. And I would say that, first of all, that war is really an institution made up of criminal behavior. When we as civilians want to solve our problems, we're not allowed to murder people and burn their houses down. I don't see why war is an acceptable means of conflict resolution. And furthermore, the majority of people that die are innocent civilians." - Scott Camil, US Vietnam Veteran

According to the Brooking’s Afghanistan Index at the end of March there were 89,000 US troops in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense lists an addition 143,839 contractors.

89,000 – Troops Deployed (March 2012)
117,227 – Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors (March 2012)
26,612 – DoD Private Security – not USAID and State (March 2012)

Total – 232,839

Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Number of US Troops from Afghanistan Index (Brookings Institution)

The Right to Protest | Graphic Images From the NYT’s

As we get ready for the NATO summit next month in Chicago and the conventions this summer these images are reminders of the challenges we face. Click on the image to expand.


Riot Gear’s Evolution | 3 December 2011

"Just as the styles of protest have changed from one generation to the next, so have the styles of protest policing. Technological advances, training innovations and changing attitudes toward the right to assemble have all shaped the way the police handle the challenges of large demonstrations. During the 1960s and ’70s, police officers treated many protests as a threat to the social order and responded with brute force. In the 1980s and ’90s, demonstrations tended to be less confrontational and the police responded with more accommodating tactics."

- Chi Birmingham and Alex S. Vitale

Protecting face-to-face protest | 9 April 2012

"EVERY four years, we witness the spectacle of the presidential nominating conventions. And every four years, host cities, party leaders and police officials devise ever more creative ways of distancing protesters from the politicians, delegates and journalists attending these stage-managed affairs."

- Ronald J. Krotoszynski Jr.

Additional Resource: When Police go military

Budget For All to End the War in Afghanistan | CPC

The first step in transforming our engagement into one based on human needs in Afghanistan. It's time to invest in peace. Click above for the link.

“End emergency war funding beginning in FY 2014. The Congressional Progressive Caucus believes that the military’s time in Afghanistan must come to a responsible and expeditious end. The Budget for All maintains Overseas Contingency Operation funding for redeployment in FY 2013, but the funding is zeroed out thereafter, and includes a prohibition on funds being used for any permanent bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. This achieves $1.1 trillion in savings over 10 years.”

The Details

"Our Budget Brings Our Troops Home & Realigns Our National Security Strategy

Our military engagements overseas are currently being financed on borrowed money, fought on borrowed time, and following a strategy unsuited for modern threats. Defense spending has nearly doubled over the last decade, and this approach has strained our military and economy to the brink. The Budget for All responsibly ends operations in Afghanistan, and puts an end to nation building outside the United States.

With two wars drawing to a close, we need a leaner, more agile force to combat 21st century risks. By employing strategies designed for today’s enemies, the CPC budget maintains a smaller, but still unparalleled, armed forces. The CPC budget reduces baseline military spending to ensure defense spending does not continue to contribute significantly to our current fiscal burden and redirects these funds to priorities such as caring for our veterans and smart diplomacy.

In total, the Budget for All achieves nearly $1.9 trillion in savings by bringing our troops home and realigning the Department of Defense. Our budget invests in foreign diplomacy and international aid to stabilize key regions of the world by smarter, more efficient means.

End emergency war funding beginning in FY 2014. The Congressional Progressive Caucus believes that the military’s time in Afghanistan must come to a responsible and expeditious end. The Budget for All maintains Overseas Contingency Operation funding for redeployment in FY 2013, but the funding is zeroed out thereafter, and includes a prohibition on funds being used for any permanent bases in Iraq or Afghanistan. This achieves $1.1trillion in savings over 10 years.

Reduce base discretionary defense spending. With more than a decade of war coming to a close, every dollar spent at the Department of Defense must be reviewed with renewed vigor. A modern defense strategy must focus our armed forces on their strengths of crisis response, defense, and deterrence. Our military needs to adapt to current threats and challenges, particularly on nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The threat of terrorist attacks could be effectively dealt with through cost-effective deployment of Intelligence and Special Operations, while eliminating failed strategies.

To suit the newly formed strategy, the Budget for All gradually achieves a smaller force structure with fewer personnel through attrition. Further, no savings are obtained by reducing military personnel wages or benefits, including TRICARE and pensions. The proportion of private contractor personnel would be significantly reduced, curbing needless “outsourcing” that creates excessive cost overruns. The contraction in force structure would also reduce expensive modernization requirements, especially for older or unnecessary platforms such as the Trident II nuclear missile, F-35, V-22 Osprey and field alternatives, and the Virginia-class submarine, which are ill-suited to handle current threats. Further, the CPC budget limits the modernization of Cold War-era nuclear weapons and infrastructure, as outlined by the Smarter Approach to Nuclear Expenditures (SANE) Act. In contrast, this budget supports the retention of current Special Operations Forces and their capacities for operations."

You can see the whole budget here.
Click here for the web page of the Congressional Progressive Caucus

Military Land Seizures Feed Resentment in Helmand

The Institute for War and Peace Reporting looks at the resentment brewing in Helmand province over the seizure of land and homes by Afghan and International Forces. Unlike night raids and other sensational abuses that receive media attention these actions ignite a slow burn. It’s what occupation looks like.

“Officials in Helmand province acknowledged there was a problem, although not all agreed on the scale of the home occupations or whether compensation was paid.

Helmand governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal said that he was aware of the issue and confirmed that both government units and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, made use of private property, including houses and farmlands.

“I have repeatedly told our police and army commanders to avoid damaging private property when they enter these areas, but there have been a number of cases where Afghan and ISAF forces have taken over and used people’s properties…”

Background:

Last year the US military commissioned a study on attitudes between US and Afghan soldiers. It reported that Afghan soldiers described their American comrades as rude, disrespectful and reckless with gunfire when civilians were nearby, while US troops saw Afghan personnel as traitorous, lazy, drug-addled and corrupt. It highlighted the deep divisions. A copy of the report is linked below.

In January the NYT’s ran excerpts of the report.

"The 70-page coalition report, titled “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility,” — which was originally distributed as an unclassified document and later changed to classified — goes far beyond anecdotes. It was conducted by a behavioral scientist who surveyed 613 Afghan soldiers and police officers, 215 American soldiers and 30 Afghan interpreters who worked for the Americans.
While the report focused on three areas of eastern Afghanistan, many of the Afghan soldiers interviewed had served elsewhere in Afghanistan and the author believed that they constituted a sample representative of the entire country.

“There are pervasive feelings of animosity and distrust A.N.S.F. personnel have towards U.S. forces,” the report said, using military’s abbreviation for Afghan security forces. The list of Afghan complaints against the Americans ran the gamut from the killing of civilians to urinating in public and cursing.

“U.S. soldiers don’t listen, they are too arrogant,” said one of the Afghan soldiers surveyed, according to the report. “They get upset due to their casualties, so they take it out on civilians during their searches,” said another.

The Americans were equally as scathing. “U.S. soldiers’ perceptions of A.N.A. members were extremely negative across categories,” the report found, using the initials for the Afghan National Army. Those categories included “trustworthiness on patrol,” “honesty and integrity,” and “drug abuse.” The Americans also voiced suspicions about the Afghans being in league with the Taliban, a problem well documented among the Afghan police.

“They are stoned all the time; some even while on patrol with us,” one soldier was quoted as saying. Another said, “They are pretty much gutless in combat; we do most of the fighting.”

A copy of the full report here.

tags: Afghan Voices, Strategic Partnership, Troop Levels

Summit for Peace and Economic Justice | 18-19 Chicago

Join us in Chicago for the Counter Summit for Peace and Economic Justice. While NATO meets, we will map campaigns for a future free of wars, occupation and the costs of a militarized foreign policy.

Details on workshops and other activities here.
Workshop proposal form here. Deadline 2 April.

Ending the Afghanistan-Pakistan War, Preventing One with Iran

"President Obama, in a prudent move, has relocated this May’s G8 [One Percent] summit from Chicago’s unpredictable streets to the protected woods of Camp David, leaving NATO to face the demands of the peace movement in a more focused confrontation this May 18-19...."

NATO CALL TO ACTION: March with veterans for justice and reconciliation

“We, Afghanistan and Iraq veterans, from around the country will converge in Chicago on May 20th to march to the NATO summit and ceremoniously return our medals to NATO generals. We were awarded these medals for serving in the Global War on Terror, a war based on lies and failed polices.”

U.S. Afghan Strategic Partnership on the Rocks

M K Bhadrakumar, a former diplomat from India, breaks down the motives on why the US is seeking to establish a bi-lateral agreement with the government of Afghanistan and abandon the constraints of a UN mandate. The second article, by the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers with Kathy Kelly, gives an on-the-ground perspective.

“The renewal of the mandate of the ISAF - multinational force leading the campaign in Afghanistan - comes up for renewal in the UN Security Council this week. The ensuing debate can be expected to bring into focus the issues of the proposed ‘transition’ in 2013, the ending of the ‘combat mission’ in 2014 and the post-2014 scenario itself. I am keenly awaiting the Indian statement.

The United States and NATO are hoping to change ships — move out of the UN mandate to a more comfortable bilateral framework with the government in Kabul so that they are not accountable to the UN and can pursue their geo-strategies in the region with impunity. The US and NATO’s expectation is to formalize a long-term military presence in the region. Simultaneously, NATO is also probing the scope for expanding its presence in Central Asia.

But the best-laid plans can go awry in Afghanistan. The present moment is one such, full of imponderables. A new, unexpected and yet compelling factor has surged, which was always there lurking below the surface but the US found it expedient to ignore — Afghan nationalism. After having taken decades of battering and with its economy in shambles, somehow a notion had crept in the Western mind that the Afghans are up for sale to the highest bidder…”

Read full blog here.


Debating the U.S. Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement

“Currently, citizens of Syria and the world can at least discuss Mr Kofi Annan’s warning that the situation in Syria should be handled “very, very carefully” to avoid an escalation that would de-stabilize the region, after an earlier warning against further militarization of the Syrian crisis. The crisis in Afghanistan is as severe as the one in Syria, and it is more chronic. 2 million Afghans have been killed in the wars of the past 4 decades. But not a single diplomat is warning against the further militarization of the Afghan crisis.

The previous UN Envoy to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, did try. “The most important reason for my bitterness was my ever-growing disagreement with Washington’s strategy in Afghanistan,” Kai Eide writes, in his book Power Struggle over Afghanistan. “It had become increasingly dominated by military strategies, forces, and offensives. Urgent civilian and political requirements were treated as appendices to the military tasks. The UN had never been really involved or consulted by Washington on critical strategy-related questions, nor had even the closest NATO partners. More importantly, Afghan authorities had mostly been spectators to the formation of a strategy aimed at solving the conflict in their own country.

It has taken the killing of 16 civilians in Kandahar for the world to notice the anger that the war has inflamed in the hearts of both U.S. soldiers and Afghan mothers.

Military and foreign policy elites in Washington have encouraged a conventional presumption that the ‘war on terror’ requires a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Underlying that presumption is a deeper assumption that ‘terrorism’ can be resolved through war, that is, a supposition that humanity can somehow counter ‘terrorism’ by killing as many ‘terrorists’ as possible, regardless of the deadly anger these killings, so similar in themselves to terrorist acts, must necessarily fuel, not to mention the costly ‘collateral damage.’

Tax-payers from the 50 coalition countries involved in the Afghan war should be alarmed at how and where their money is spent. They should be considering how they would feel were they offered $2000 in compensation for the murder of a child, husband, father or mother, the compensation NATO handed out ‘ex-gratia’ (with no admission of its own wrongdoing) to the families of the 16 children, women and men slaughtered in their sleep on March 11, 2012.

Will the Afghan Parliament, the U.S. public or the UN debate the 10 year U.S. war strategy in Afghanistan?

Will the Afghan Parliament, the U.S. public or the UN debate the U.S. Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement?...”

Read full article here.

The Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers are a grassroots group of multi-ethnic, ordinary Afghans working towards non-military solutions for Afghanistan, based on non-violence, unity, equality and self-reliance. http://ourjourneytosmile.com and http://globaldaysoflistening.org.


Additional Links:

Loya Jirga to Approve Long-Term US Military Presence

Tags: Strategic Partnership

Taliban Suspend Talks | Karzai Demands US Back to Bases

The decision by the Taliban to suspend talks, and the demand by President Karzai that all US and NATO troops leave the village-centered forward-operating bases, are fundamental rejections of current US policy.

The murder last weekend of 16 Afghan civilians by a US soldier is being used by President Karzai to demand (once again) that US and NATO forces vacate the forward-operating bases scattered across the country. These bases are the launch pads for kill/capture operations and night raids that have angered Afghans across the country.

The map above does not show all the bases that the US and NATO have in the country but it gives a sense. Last week Nick Turse documented the real number as more than 450.

In early 2010, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had nearly 400 bases in Afghanistan. Today, Lieutenant Lauren Rago of ISAF public affairs tells TomDispatch, the number tops 450.

Kate Clark has an analysis of the Taliban statement released yesterday. It should be no surprise that the presence of foreign troops it at the core of their demands.

‘… the Afghan issue has two main dimensions; one is internal and the other external… Until and unless the external dimension is settled which rests entirely in the hands of the foreigners, discussing the internal dimension is meaningless and is nothing more than a waste of time. Therefore the Islamic Emirate considers talking with the Kabul administration as pointless.’ - Taliban Statement

Taliban Suspend Talks

“There has been a worrying lack of urgency from the Americans about the opportunity for talks provided by the Taleban’s opening on 3 January of a political office in Qatar. The move, which necessarily had been approved by Washington, was proof of some political courage by both sides, something tangible emerging from their months’ long dance of comments which had appeared aimed at somehow encouraging the other or mitigating their fears (for detail, see AAN blog). However, the timing of the Qatar office opening was always going to be tricky. Early January did not give much time to come up with something more solid before the Taleban had to either decide to keep talking or start rousing the rank and file to go back into battle after their winter rest.

The Taleban have now suspended the political process unilaterally. The statement, unusually for the Taleban holds back on the rhetoric and insults and instead concentrates quite soberly on making political points. They said the US envoy in his latest meeting presented new conditions which contradicted an already agreed memorandum of understanding. The Americans, were they said, ‘wasting time’. (The full text of the Taleban statement can be seen at the end of this piece).

The statement says the ‘diplomatic office in Qatar was opened with the purpose of ‘reaching an understanding with the international community’ and of ‘addressing some specific issues with the American invaders.’ It said the Taleban wanted to be able to have face-to-face dialogue in ‘complete freedom’ and ‘away from danger’ and to silence critics who said the Taleban had no address (where they could be spoken to) or was just a ‘warring faction’ which had no political or administrative capacities and wanted to harm other nations. To this end, the statement said, they ‘started holding preliminary talks with the occupying enemy.’

***

Ahmad Rashid writing earlier this week in the financial times raised the same point. Arguing that the Government of Afghanistan can’t seek a long-term US military presence and peace with the Taliban.

“The Afghan president’s desire to seek a strategic partnership agreement with the US is becoming more and more unacceptable to the Afghan people. At the same time he also wants to make peace with the Taliban, but they have no desire for a pact with Washington. His dilemma, which he still refuses to understand, is that he can either ask for a long-term US presence or peace with the Taliban, but not both.”

It is based on this fact.

“Increasing numbers of Afghans would agree with what the Taliban have been arguing for almost a decade: that the western presence in Afghanistan is prolonging the war, causing misery and bloodshed.”

He ends with the challenges ahead.

“After the spate of incidents this year, there should be no doubt in Washington that seeking a negotiated settlement to end the war with the Taliban as quickly as possible is the only way out. Mr Obama has to put his weight behind this strategy to ensure an orderly withdrawal and to give the Afghan people the chance of an end to this war. A power-sharing formula with the Taliban, which now appears increasingly unavoidable, and an accord with neighbouring states to limit their interference, will be key.

In 1989 it was America and Pakistan who refused to allow a political solution to end the fighting because they wanted not just the Soviets gone but also Moscow’s Afghan protégées led by Mohammad Najibullah. Instead he hung on for three years, resulting in a civil war. America cannot again leave Afghanistan with a civil war as its bequest to the Afghans. Washington, and Nato, must seek an end to the war before withdrawing their forces. Despite the tragic death of so many innocent children, this is still possible if there is a concerted diplomatic and political push.”

****

Additional analysis: Taliban

Nightmare in Afghanistan | UFPJ Action Alert

Reuters is reporting that this morning the White House is not reviewing a faster or larger withdrawal of U.S. troops after the shooting deaths of 16 Afghan civilians by a U.S. soldier.

"The White House is not currently reviewing options for further troop withdrawals and no decisions have been made. As the president has said, we will bring home a total of 33,000 troops by next summer," White House spokesman Tommy Vietor said in a statement.

"After that initial reduction, our troops will continue coming home at a steady pace as Afghan security forces move into the lead. The president will make decisions on further drawdowns at the appropriate time based on our interests and in consultation with our allies and Afghan partners."

AFSC is an active member of the United for Peace and Justice network. Take a moment to call and send a message to your member of Congress.


The situation in Afghanistan is a nightmare.

The surge has not worked. As we escalated the war, the insurgency fought harder and grew in numbers. Western troops are seen as foreign occupiers in the Afghan homeland, and now have murdered 16 civilians, including little children, in the middle of the night in Kandahar province. The surge has produced a record number of coalition and Afghan deaths, injuries and lost limbs. The surge has not stopped the momentum of the insurgency; just last year there were over 16,000 IED attacks against U.S. troops – a record number. And the cost of an average IED is just $30.

Bring our troops home. Call your member of Congress toll-free at 877-429-0678 or click here to send an e-mail.

Afghan outrage over Koran burnings and murders is yet another vivid reminder of what has gone very wrong in Afghanistan. American troops do not speak Afghan languages and are not familiar with Afghan culture. They are not able to build Afghanistan – that must be done by Afghans, and they can begin as soon as U.S. troops withdraw.

Lt. Col. Daniel Davis, a highly respected military officer, who recently returned from Afghanistan, has written a declassified report detailing the actual state of affairs in Afghanistan. He states: “Senior ranking U.S. military leaders have so distorted the truth when communicating with the U.S. Congress and the American people in regards to conditions on the ground in Afghanistan that the truth has become unrecognizable. This deception has damaged America’s credibility among both our allies and enemies, severely limiting our ability to reach a political solution to the war in Afghanistan.”

This insanity must end, and quickly. Going into our 11th year of war, we know that more time, money, and resources will not change the realities in Afghanistan.

Bring our troops home now. Call your member of Congress toll-free at 877-429-0678 or click here to send an e-mail.

Along with Lt. Col. Davis, we call on the House and Senate Armed Services Committees to conduct an investigation and public hearings into the facts about Afghanistan calling the senior and former generals referred to in Davis’ report to provide their version of events under oath.

U.S. Troops and all Americans Deserve the Truth

Contact your Member of Congress to co-sponsor H.780, Barbara Lee's bill, which limits funding for the Afghanistan war to providing for the safe and orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan of all members of the Armed Forces and Department of Defense contractor personnel who are in Afghanistan. Read the text of the bill and see the list of cosponsors.

Click here to send an e-mail to your Member of Congress asking him or her to support H.780 or call their office toll-free at 877-429-0678.

(Thanks to Friends Committee on National Legislation for providing the toll-free number!) Please report back results to rustiandgael@unitedforpeace.org

- UFPJ Afghanistan Working Group

War Crimes, Apologies, Immunity | 16 Killed by US Soldier

Over the weekend a US Soldier burst into several Afghan homes killing 16. Nine of the dead are children and it appears the bodies were set on fire. Extensive coverage from AP, NYT, and Reuters for details.

U.S. Strategy

There are currently over 90,000 US troops, 40,000 other foreign forces, and 133,866 private contractors working with the U.S. military in Afghanistan. These figures also do not account for U.S. Special Forces, the CIA, CIA trained Afghan forces, US armed militias or the Afghan Local Police.

The U.S. NATO strategy has been to create and train a standing army of 240,000 soldiers with the addition of 160,000 police. Theoretically, these forces will facilitate the removal of combat forces when the NATO mission ends in 2014 to be replaced by a US-Afghan strategic partnership that will allow the U.S. to continue its military presence through the search and destroy tactics of the special forces. See Ann Jones here.

Alternatives

"We feel that, surely, governments need to resolve this conflict through diplomacy and move away from the failed military strategy that has resulted in all that we are witnessing today," says the Kabul-based peace activist who goes is the coordinator for Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers.


Juan Cole puts it in a broader historical context.

“In the history of anti-colonial struggles (which is how the anti-US forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan see the war), almost accidental minor incidents frequently became rallying cry.”

Afghans to US Military: Be at Least a Little Ashamed

This is one Afghanistan newspaper’s reaction today to the story of the massacre by a US staff sergeant of 16 villagers, including 9 children, near Qandahar. It is a medley of photographs of US troops in the country. Note that the source, Afghanpaper.com, in Dari Persian, is considered an “independent” news source by the US government; it is not a Taliban operation, and has usually been balanced. The headline is, “Let us be at least a little bit ashamed.”

*****

The fairness or unfairness of the contextless collage below is irrelevant to its emotional impact on Afghans whose sense of national sovereignty is being injured by the more-than-a-decade US occupation of their country. Going into homes where there are unveiled women, and exposing them to the gaze of 18 year old strange American men, is always going to anger Afghans. I’ve had US government people almost shout at me that such considerations cannot be allowed to come into play when you are doing counter-terrorism, that the chief thing is to find the weapons caches. But this kind of thing is why the Iraqi parliament voted the US troops right out of their country as soon as they could, and if the Afghan parliament had any real power, it would, too (some parliamentarians have already called for a jihad against the US over the Qur’an burning fiasco).

The Qur’an-burning scandal and this soldier going berserk are in many ways tangential to the Afghanistan War, but this does not mean they are unimportant. In the history of anti-colonial struggles (which is how the anti-US forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan see the war), almost accidental minor incidents frequently became rallying cry. The Dinshaway incident in Egypt in 1906 is a famous example. Some 13 years later there were hundreds of thousands of Egyptians in the streets demanding a British departure, which was achieved in 1922.

The US is hoping to be mostly out of Afghanistan by the end of 2013. But there is a plan for special forces to remain in the long term. The Peshawar-based Frontier Post calls this plan a “wild goose chase” for the US, and says it almost certainly doomed to failure.

Additional Resource:

Afghans for Peace are organizing vigils around the world.

Impunity | Private and Military Contractors in Afghanistan

More civilian contractors working for U.S. companies than U.S. soldiers died in Afghanistan last year for the first time during the war.

While mercenaries and contractors have been used in every US war – including the revolutionary war – the number of private contractors used by the military and increasingly by the State department is higher than ever before. Raising questions of ethics and morality.


Afghanistan

98,933 – Troops Deployed in and around Afghanistan (December 2011)
113,491 – Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors (Jan. 2012)
20,375 – DoD Private Security – does not include USAID and State (Jan. 2012)

Total – 232,799

Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Number of US Troops from SIGAR


These figures do not include the estimated 11,000 private security contractors that will report directly to the Government of Afghanistan in March following the implementation of Presidential degree 62.

In December 2009, Afghan President Karzai issued Presidential Decree 62 dissolving private security contractors (PSCs), which provide security for the U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. embassy and U.S. government contractors. The U.S. embassy subsequently negotiated an exemption for U.S. government facilities, including the Department of Defense, but failed to include an exemption for USAID development projects or any other U.S. Government contracts performed by U.S. firms in Afghanistan.

Under intense diplomatic pressure, President Karzai approved a “bridging strategy” that extended the use of PSCs to guard foreign-funded development projects to March 20, 2012 while the new APPF was stood up.

These figures also do not account for U.S. Special Forces, the CIA, CIA trained Afghan forces, US armed militias or the Afghan Local Police.

Click troop levels for more posts.

Death and Deception | A Colonel Speaks Out

Death and Deception in Afghanistan
Matthew Hoh | Monday 6 February 2012

“Today, the New York Times reports that an active duty Army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Daniel L. Davis, has submitted a classified report to members of Congress that documents the failings of US policy in Afghanistan. More importantly, LTC Davis attests that senior leaders of the Department of Defense, both uniformed and civilian, have intentionally and consistently misled the American people and Congress on the conduct and progress of the Afghan War. The 58-page classified report he prepared, briefed and submitted to senators, representatives and cleared staff members over the last few weeks utilizes nearly 50 historical and current classified sources and draws from 250 interviews he conducted with soldiers throughout Afghanistan during his most recent year-long combat deployment.

In addition to the classified report, LTC Davis has written an 86-page unclassified version, as well as an article, published today by the Armed Forces Journal (below). These reports depict a near institutionalizing of dishonesty and deception by senior DOD leadership towards the American public and Congress. LTC Davis documents, as well, examples from the Iraq war and major weapons procurement programs to illustrate the persistent duplicity of the Pentagon's senior ranks. Victory narratives, career ambitions and institutional protection fuel these deceits. Deceits that have only delivered the loss of thousands of lives, the waste of hundreds of billions of dollars and the failure to achieve American policy objectives.”

Truth, lies and Afghanistan: How military leaders have let us down
BY LT. COL. DANIEL L. DAVIS

“I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.

What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground."

He ends with an appeal for truth.

"When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.

Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start."

SIGAR Report on Relief and Reconstruction

On Monday the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released the final report for 2011. These reports are mandated by law and must be delivered to Congress each quarter. The report covers the time period that marked 10 years since the US assault in October of 2001 and carries the tag line '10 years of reconstruction 2001-2011'.

Of particular interest is the fact that 61% of the money articulated for relief and reconstruction is actually spent on funding, arming and training government forces, private militias, and undercover units that operate along the border with Pakistan.

The report confirms that 98,933 U.S. forces remained in the country at year’s end.

It does not dwell on the Afghan government demands to disband the failed military-led Provisional Reconstruction Teams linking US military strategy with development and reconstruction, or the Afghan government demand that armed private security firms be disbanded.

Nevertheless, these are authoritative figures on what the US is actually spending resources on in Afghanistan. You can see from the chart above that all assistance for humanitarian relief will be eliminated in 2012.

The chart graphically shows the growing dependance on exclusive military priorities over the years.

For this year 88% will be military.

Simply appalling and immoral.

***

I added the percentages in brackets for the text below lifted from the report.

SIGAR – 2011 Final Report - Some Figures

As of December 31, 2011, the United States had appropriated nearly $85.54 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since FY 2002. This total has been approximately allocated as follows:

• $52.14 billion for security (61%)
• $20.28 billion for governance and development (24%)
• $5.67 billion for counter-narcotics efforts (7%)
• $2.24 billion for humanitarian aid (3%)
• $5.20 billion for oversight and operations (6%)

US Troop Levels – 31 December 2012

According to U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A), 98,933 U.S. forces were serving in the country as of December 31, 2011.

• 71,742 to ISAF
• 2,780 to NTM-A/CSTC-A
• 14,565 to USFOR-A
• 9,846 to other assignments (CENTCOM)

Additional Resources:

Eisenhower Research Project | War Costs $4 Trillion

3 Cents on the Dollar

The Best Way to Peace | Anatol Lieven

A political/military overview of Afghanistan’s recent history with foreign intervention and war. Using the Soviet experience – and a variety of books – Lieven offers valuable analysis and suggestions. The failure to design and implement inclusive peace processes along the way have led to more violence and increased tension in the region.

The insights into US-Pakistan relations, the impact of a long-term US presence and the need to acknowledged a post-Karzai Afghanistan are all discussed.

The book list is below.

Afghanistan: The Best Way to Peace

“The United States and its allies today find themselves in a position in Afghanistan similar to that of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, after Mikhail Gorbachev decided on military withdrawal by a fixed deadline. They are in a race against the clock to build up a regime and army that will survive their withdrawal, while either seeking a peace agreement with the leaders of the insurgent forces or splitting off their more moderate, pragmatic, and mercenary elements and making an agreement with them. The Soviets succeeded at least partially in some of these objectives, while failing utterly to achieve a peace settlement.”

Negotiations with the Taliban

“On the basis of my conversations in recent years with former leading figures in the Taliban and Pakistanis close to Mullah Omar and his colleagues, my own judgment is that a peace settlement between the US, the administration in Kabul, and the Afghan Taliban would probably have to be based on some variant of the following elements:

(1) complete withdrawal of all US troops according to a fixed timetable;
(2) exclusion of al-Qaeda and other international terrorist groups from areas controlled by the Taliban;
(3) a government in Kabul headed—at least nominally—by men the Taliban would see as good Muslims and Afghan patriots;
(4) negotiations on a new Afghan constitution involving the Taliban and leading to the transfer of most powers from the center to the regions;
(5) de facto—though not formal—Taliban control of the region of Greater Kandahar, and by the Haqqanis of Greater Paktika;
(6) a return to the Taliban offer of 1999–2001 of a complete ban on opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in the areas under their control, in return for international aid.

On the last point, it should be remembered that the Taliban are the only force to have achieved such a degree of control of the drug trade during the past thirty years. Certainly, based on their record to date, the idea that our own Afghan allies will do so after the US withdraws is pure fantasy.”

Pakistan, the impact of a long-term US military presence, preparing for a post-Karzai Afghanistan.

"For the Pakistani military as a whole, however, a peace settlement along the lines I have sketched above would fulfill its essential needs. It would keep the influence of India in Afghanistan at a distance from Pakistan’s borders. It would ensure adequate Pashtun representation in Afghan government, limiting the power of forces linked to India. It would remove the catastrophic threat of Indian-backed Tajik forces fighting an ethnic civil war in Afghanistan’s Pashtun territories, sending fresh millions of refugees fleeing into Pakistan. And it would end the US drone strikes and raids that are infuriating the lower ranks of the Pakistani military and leading to catastrophic clashes between Pakistani and US forces along the Afghan border.

Such an outcome would serve a vital interest of the United States. For it is no exaggeration to say that the tension between the Pakistani military and the United States now poses a threat to US security that dwarfs either the Taliban or the battered remnants of the old al-Qaeda. As I have found from speaking with Pakistani soldiers, and from visiting military families in the chief areas of recruitment in northern Punjab and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, the fury of the junior ranks against the US is reaching a dangerous pitch. These soldiers share both the sympathy for the Afghan Taliban of the population at large and that population’s deep distrust of US intentions. They are increasingly angry with their own commanders, whom they view as cowardly and corrupt; and they are profoundly humiliated when they return to their towns and villages and are asked by neighbors—and even their own women—why as slaves of the US they are killing fellow Muslims.

There seems, as a result, a strong likelihood that if Pakistani soldiers encounter US soldiers on what is or what they believe to be Pakistani soil, they will fight. This is apparently what happened in the incident on November 26 in which twenty-four Pakistani soldiers were killed by US forces, leading to a drastic further deterioration in relations (including retaliatory closing of the border to NATO). That encounter was bad enough; but if such clashes continue then at some point things will go the other way, and Americans will be killed—possibly a lot of Americans, if for example the Pakistanis shoot down a helicopter. If on the other hand the Pakistani generals order their men not to fight, the resulting outrage could undermine discipline to the point where the unity of the army could be in question—and if the army breaks apart, not only will immense munitions and expertise flow to terrorists, but the Pakistani state will collapse. This would be a historic triumph for al-Qaeda and its allies—and like the invasion of Iraq, one made possible for them by the United States.

To my astonishment, I find that some US officials are now arguing that a principal reason why the US must retain bases in Afghanistan—even at the price of making a settlement with the Taliban impossible—is in order to continue striking at al-Qaeda and other extremist targets in Pakistan’s border areas. More than ten years after September 11, it is simply appalling that supposedly well-informed people are still treating the terrorist threat in such a crude and mechanistic fashion. Have they not realized that the membership of al-Qaeda and its allies is not fixed, but depends on al-Qaeda’s ability to recruit among Muslims infuriated by US actions? Or that a terrorist attack on the US is as likely—more likely—to be planned in Karachi, Lahore, the English town of Bradford, or New York as in Pakistan’s frontier areas? An essential US motive for a peace settlement in Afghanistan, one allowing complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, is precisely that it would allow America to pull back from the existing confrontation with Pakistan—not continue it into the indefinite future, with all the gains that this would create for resentment by extremists.

Even if the advantages of a settlement are recognized by Washington, how can the US sell it to its allies in Afghanistan, to President Karzai and his followers, and to the leaders of the non-Pashtun ethnic groups? The answer lies partly in assuring all the other parties that the US will continue to guarantee military support against any future Taliban move to attack Kabul or invade the north; and partly in the approaching train wreck that the simultaneous departure of both US troops and Karzai may cause.

The pursuit of a peace settlement should be combined with the discussion of a post-Karzai political order in Kabul, and with an Afghan national debate on reform of the constitution, which is now widely recognized to be deeply flawed and far too centralized, and which was never truly approved by the Afghan people. The first step to peace with the Taliban therefore should be to acknowledge their right to participate in a genuine national debate on a new Afghan constitution.

Finally, what of the fate of the social progress made since 2001, especially with respect to women’s rights? Jonathan Steele gives a powerful answer to the question. The melancholy truth is that the Taliban are no more reactionary in this regard than most of Afghan rural society. As the briefest glance at media coverage of Afghanistan in recent years makes clear, the limited gains for women’s rights have been made only under intense Western pressure and in the face of apparent strong resistance from our own Afghan political and military allies.

Where the Taliban were different—and attracted international opprobrium—was not in their basic culture, but in the way they codified the suppression of women in state law rather than leaving it to local and family custom. Moreover, they extended this suppression to the cities where women had made real though precarious progress over the course of the twentieth century. The task of the US and its allies therefore must be to preserve the cities at least as areas where women can continue to enjoy more rights and opportunities in the hope that a new culture will gradually spread from them to the countryside.

This is a depressing prospect when compared with the hopes that followed the overthrow of the Taliban ten years ago. But let us face facts. Our societies and official establishments have demonstrated beyond any possible doubt that they lack the stamina and capacity for sacrifice necessary to remain in Afghanistan for the decades that would be necessary to transform the position of Afghan women as a whole; and there is nothing ethical or responsible about setting goals from the safety of London or Washington that informed people know cannot in fact be reached. We do have a chance to try to do better than the Soviets and to try to save Afghanistan from an endless future of civil war, and to establish a peace in which future progress may be possible. It is our duty to take that chance."

The books

Afgantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan, 1979–89
by Rodric Braithwaite

A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
by Artemy M. Kalinovsky

Killing the Cranes: A Reporter’s Journey Through Three Decades of War in Afghanistan
by Edward Girardet

Ghosts of Afghanistan: Hard Truths and Foreign Myths
by Jonathan Steele

The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers
by Peter Tomsen

Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity
by Riaz Mohammad Khan

Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan
US Department of Defense

Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field
edited by Antonio Giustozzi

An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010. by Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn