Afghan Local Police | A Dangerous and Deadly Path

The Upper House of Parliament today demanded an investigation into the Afghan Local Police (ALP) after the killing of 11 civilians in Kunduz province on Sunday. Armed and trained by US Special Forces and initiated by General Petraeus the ALP is under the control of the Interior Ministry.

Most Afghans understand the program to be the creation of unaccountable militia forces. Bringing back memories of the terrible civil war violence between foreign armed militia armies.

It's a dangerous and deadly path.

Last September Human Rights Watch said the initiative was "a high-risk strategy to achieve short-term goals in which local groups are again being armed without adequate oversight or accountability."

Emal Habib, writing for the Afghanistan Analyst Network, investigates governmental and international support for the militia. Noting that the Afghan Local Police (or Arbaki) are presented as “armed, popular local uprisings” that have “expelled the Taliban” from several districts in eastern Afghanistan.

As commander of US forces in Afghanistan before taking over as head of the CIA David H. Petraeus said in hearings before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services that the arming of the private militias was “… in essence, a community watch with AK–47s”

On Sunday US forces announced they were suspending the training of 1,000 recruits of the 15,000 person force due to attacks against foreign forces (LA Times, The Hill, NYT )

Additional Resources:

The Generals Visit | Night Raids and Militia Forces

Impunity, Militias and the Afghan Local Police | HRW Report

From Arbaki to Local Police | Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission

The Numbers | Troops and Contractors | July 2012

For decades outside powers have intervened and occupied Afghanistan. The commitment of the international community to arm different groups is one reason the conflict has been so deadly for so long.

What is the current number of US and Afghan forces currently deployed and funded?

The answer may surprise you.

The combined forces - paid for by the US - is 567,655.

The office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) released their mandated quarterly report yesterday. With access to all official agencies involved with the war, it is one of the most authoritative reports available to the public.

The Special Inspector report is used to document the total number of US troops and Afghan National Security Forces. The figure for contractors comes from CENTCOM and the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense.

Here is the breakdown.

Afghanistan National Security Forces
191,592 – Afghan National Army (May 2012)
146,641 – Afghan National Police (June 2012)
Total – 338,233

US Military and Contractors

87,000 – Troops Deployed in Afghanistan (June 2012)
113,736 – Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors (July 2012)
28,686 – DoD Private Security – does not include USAID and State (July 2012)

Total – 229,422


Number of US Troops from SIGAR
Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Afghan Security Forces from SIGAR

Two additional points from the special inspector report.

The goal is to build the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) to 352,000 and then reduce the force to 228,500 by 2017. The Government of Afghanistan is scheduled to contribute $500 million by 2015. That represents less than 10% of the cost.

“The United States is covering most of the costs of the ANA (and provides a substantial amount for the ANP. The NATO Summit joint communiqué stipulates that the Afghan government will contribute $500 million in 2015 toward the sustainment of its security forces and gradually increase its share of the ANSF costs until 2024, when it will have full financial responsibility for its security forces.”

On July 6, 2012, President Obama signed the order making Afghanistan a Major Non-NATO Ally. That makes it eligible for U.S. training, loans of equipment for research and development, and foreign military financing.

Troops and Contractors in Afghanistan | March 2012

On Sunday it was announced that the United States and Afghanistan had agreed to the framework of a Strategic Partnership Agreement. The document has not been made public but we know it commits the United States to a lasting presence in Afghanistan through at least 2024.

In the U.S., it will by-pass congressional oversight and simply needs the signature of President Obama. In Afghanistan, Parliamentary hearings began on Monday but it is unclear whether or not they need to 'approve' the treaty or if it moves forward with the signature of President Karzai.

"What I understand is what it's like to be in a war zone and I understand the behavior in a war zone. And I would say that, first of all, that war is really an institution made up of criminal behavior. When we as civilians want to solve our problems, we're not allowed to murder people and burn their houses down. I don't see why war is an acceptable means of conflict resolution. And furthermore, the majority of people that die are innocent civilians." - Scott Camil, US Vietnam Veteran

According to the Brooking’s Afghanistan Index at the end of March there were 89,000 US troops in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense lists an addition 143,839 contractors.

89,000 – Troops Deployed (March 2012)
117,227 – Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors (March 2012)
26,612 – DoD Private Security – not USAID and State (March 2012)

Total – 232,839

Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Number of US Troops from Afghanistan Index (Brookings Institution)

SIGAR Report on Relief and Reconstruction

On Monday the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction released the final report for 2011. These reports are mandated by law and must be delivered to Congress each quarter. The report covers the time period that marked 10 years since the US assault in October of 2001 and carries the tag line '10 years of reconstruction 2001-2011'.

Of particular interest is the fact that 61% of the money articulated for relief and reconstruction is actually spent on funding, arming and training government forces, private militias, and undercover units that operate along the border with Pakistan.

The report confirms that 98,933 U.S. forces remained in the country at year’s end.

It does not dwell on the Afghan government demands to disband the failed military-led Provisional Reconstruction Teams linking US military strategy with development and reconstruction, or the Afghan government demand that armed private security firms be disbanded.

Nevertheless, these are authoritative figures on what the US is actually spending resources on in Afghanistan. You can see from the chart above that all assistance for humanitarian relief will be eliminated in 2012.

The chart graphically shows the growing dependance on exclusive military priorities over the years.

For this year 88% will be military.

Simply appalling and immoral.

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I added the percentages in brackets for the text below lifted from the report.

SIGAR – 2011 Final Report - Some Figures

As of December 31, 2011, the United States had appropriated nearly $85.54 billion for relief and reconstruction in Afghanistan since FY 2002. This total has been approximately allocated as follows:

• $52.14 billion for security (61%)
• $20.28 billion for governance and development (24%)
• $5.67 billion for counter-narcotics efforts (7%)
• $2.24 billion for humanitarian aid (3%)
• $5.20 billion for oversight and operations (6%)

US Troop Levels – 31 December 2012

According to U.S. Forces - Afghanistan (USFOR-A), 98,933 U.S. forces were serving in the country as of December 31, 2011.

• 71,742 to ISAF
• 2,780 to NTM-A/CSTC-A
• 14,565 to USFOR-A
• 9,846 to other assignments (CENTCOM)

Additional Resources:

Eisenhower Research Project | War Costs $4 Trillion

3 Cents on the Dollar

The Generals Visit | Night Raids and Militia Forces

William McRaven, commander of US Special Operations Forces, gave a rare interview in Kabul over the weekend. Defending two of the most controversial US/NATO war tactics he pledged to continue the kill/capture program being carried out through night raids, and gave his support to expand the Afghan Local Police, a paramilitary force.

It's a dangerous and deadly path.

As commander of US forces in Afghanistan before taking over as head of the CIA David H. Petraeus said in hearings before the US Senate Committee on Armed Services that the arming of the private militias was “… in essence, a community watch with AK–47s”

Most Afghans understand the program to be the creation of unaccountable militia armies. Bringing back memories of the terrible violence of the civil war fought between foreign armed militia armies.

In September Human Rights Watch said the initiative was "a high-risk strategy to achieve short-term goals in which local groups are again being armed without adequate oversight or accountability."

The Wall Street Journal reports

The U.S. military is preparing to triple the number of local fighters in the program over the next two years, with 30,000 members set to fan out in 99 districts, said Col. John Evans, deputy commanding officer of Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command in Afghanistan.

There is a sobering link with the US policy of arming the Sunni Awakening in Iraq and the legacy it left behind. The awakening is estimated to still have between 50,000 – 80,000 armed members, and are resisting Iraqi government demands that they disarm by the end of the year.

The New York Times observes

With two weeks left before the United States military completes its withdrawal from Iraq, these units, known broadly as the Sunni Awakening, still remain outside the new Iraqi police force and army. Ragtag groups of men wearing jeans and carrying rifles at dusty checkpoints throughout western Iraq, they are a loose end left by the United States.

For more background: Afghanistan 101 posts on Afghan Militias, Night Raids, and the Afghan experience with war.

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Mural Image: What's Left of Kabul


Created by Guilford College Community and Hanna Swenson, Courtney Mandeville and Layth Awartani

Windows and Mirrors: Reflections of the War in Afghanistan

Impunity, Militias and the Afghan Local Police | HRW Report

Human Rights Watch issued a report today looking at the proliferation of militia forces in Afghanistan. The report finds the U.S.-backed initiative to create the Afghan Local Police (ALP) "a high-risk strategy to achieve short-term goals in which local groups are again being armed without adequate oversight or accountability."

Refugees International and Oxfam International have also recently issued reports condemning the arming, financing and training of the Afghan Local Police.

Just Don’t Call It a Militia: Impunity, Militias and the Afghan Local Police

(Kabul) – Militias and some units of the new US-backed Afghan Local Police are committing serious human rights abuses, but the government is not providing proper oversight or holding them accountable, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today. The Afghan government and the US should sever ties with irregular armed groups and take immediate steps to create properly trained and vetted security forces that are held accountable for their actions.

The 102-page report, “‘Just Don’t Call It a Militia:’ Impunity, Militias and the ‘Afghan Local Police,’” documents serious abuses, such as killings, rape, arbitrary detention, abductions, forcible land grabs, and illegal raids by irregular armed groups in northern Kunduz province and the Afghan Local Police (ALP) force in Baghlan, Herat, and Uruzgan provinces. The Afghan government has failed to hold these forces to account, fostering future abuses and generating support for the Taliban and other opposition forces, Human Rights Watch found.

“The Afghan government has responded to the insurgency by reactivating militias that threaten the lives of ordinary Afghans” said Brad Adams, Asia director at Human Rights Watch. “Kabul and Washington need to make a clean break from supporting abusive and destabilizing militias to have any hope of a viable, long-term security strategy."

Click here for the full report.

Arbaki | Private Militias

From today’s New York Times.

“Government officials seeking to break up hundreds of small independent militias in the volatile northern province of Kunduz have ordered more than 4,000 members to surrender their weapons within 20 days or face a military crackdown, threatening more violence in a region where security has steadily eroded over the last two years.

The militias in many cases piggybacked on an officially sanctioned American-financed program to recruit local men for police patrols to fight off the Taliban, an effort that has been tried in other parts of the country with varying degrees of success.”

The American financed program called the Afghan Local Police (ALP) is modeled on the Sons of Iraq initiative that armed and supported 100,000 Iraqi militia forces.

“This is an important program because no one protects their home like a homeowner and this really mobilizes a community. When community representatives, shura council members, nominate their sons to defend their village, their valleys, this is them defending their community and showing their commitment to fight the Taliban." General David Petraeus – July 2011

"Where we have them trained and fully employed, the Taliban is not re-emerging," said Army Brig. Gen. Jefforey Smith, an assistant commanding general at the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan.

Afghan and coalition officials recently approved a plan that would allow the local forces to grow as large as 30,000, Smith said. The original plan authorized a force of 10,000.

In the report No Time to Lose released in May Oxfam had two recommendations to the United States and the Afghan Ministry of the Interior.

1) Suspend further expansion of the ALP program until appropriate vetting, training and oversight can be assured, previous initiatives have been evaluated, and credible, independent monitoring of the program has been established. The planned expansion of the ALP risks further stretching the ability of both USFORA and the MoI to ensure the program’s integrity and to mitigate the risk of the program being subverted in the interests of local commanders. Crucially, the ALP must not be established in the absence of a credible, tribally balanced shura comprised of respected elders with genuine capacity to provide oversight; and recruits must be subject to the same disciplinary regulations and oversight mechanisms that apply to the main pillars of the ANP. The findings (and methodology) of independent monitoring of the program should be made available to the public.

2) Terminate community defence initiatives falling outside the formal structure of the ANP, and suspend all government funding for such initiatives. This requires greater coordination between the national and district governments regarding the roll-out of the ALP program. In areas where non-ALP community defence initiatives exist, the MoI should – in consultation with communities and civil society groups – ensure that the members of such groups are disciplined/prosecuted as appropriate, or where requested by communities (and subject to the above recommendation), transitioned to ALP. USFOR-A/MoI should also step up efforts to promote community understanding of the ALP program, with a view to making it more difficult for groups not sanctioned by the MoI to operate under the banner of ALP.

Refugees International | Field Report

Lynn Yoshikawa and Matt Pennington assessed the needs of internally displaced people in Afghanistan in May 2011. This is their report. It is powerful testimony to the impact of the surge and the creation of new militia forces called Afghan Local Police (ALP). Simply put, they find Afghans civilians caught in the middle of an intensifying military campaign against a fractured armed insurgency.

Responsible U.S. Transition Must Address Displacement Crisis
Refugees International | Field Report | 28 June 2011

"Despite the U.S. military’s claims of progress, insurgent attacks are up by 50% over last year, and more than 250,000 people have fled their villages in the past two years. U.S. funded and trained militias are only exacerbating this explosive situation…”

"Since January 1, more than 91,000 Afghans have fled their villages – compared with 42,000 over the same time period last year. This is mostly due to international and Afghan forces’ military operations against the Taliban…”

"Although General Petraeus touts local defense initiatives as successfully thwarting the insurgency, the proliferation of militias is increasing insecurity, especially in the north. Many new militias operate under the guise of the U.S./ISAF-backed Afghan Local Police (ALP) initiative. Internally Displaced People (IDPs), government officials, security analysts and humanitarian actors told RI that the expansion of poorly vetted, ill-trained and unsupervised ALP units and irregular militias are a major threat to civilians and stability. These armed groups have allegedly committed abuses including murder, theft, extortion, bribery and intimidation.”

They provide five policy recommendations

“The incoming ISAF commander should issue a directive to all forces under his command to reduce displacement and share information on displacement with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

The U.S. Congress should withhold payments to the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program until the Secretary of Defense certifies that adequate recruitment, vetting, discipline and command/control structures have been established, as well as a clear timeframe for the program’s integration into the Afghan National Police.

UNHCR and OCHA should request funding to double their protection and humanitarian affairs officers in critical regional offices to meet growing humanitarian needs.

The UN should immediately appoint an experienced candidate to the Humanitarian Coordinator post.

The U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) should work with the Afghan government to develop an inter-agency plan to address forced displacement.”