The Path Forward | Day two of the Jirga

The best way to acknowledge the millions and millions of war widows, orphans, and displaced is to end this war. Helping people meet basic needs should be seen as an obligation and a strategic priority, not an act of charity.

Instead, the US is making threats and ultimatums. Demanding a quick decision that endorses a militarized super-structure focusing more on US goals than Afghan needs by asking…

How many US troops will be in the country?
What will be their role as advisers and enablers to Afghan forces?
Will they be allowed to conduct night raids and detain people?
Will they have immunity from Afghan law?
What type of weapons systems should we provide?
Can they attack bordering countries from Afghanistan?
Will they be obliged to respond to attacks from bordering countries?

Photo from UNICEF – Afghanistan

The Other Guantanamo: Afghanistan begins Internment

In March, the United States and Afghanistan completed negotiations to begin turning over control of Afghan prisoners to the government of Afghanistan. On Monday, Afghan institutions could start ruling on the internment of its own citizens. The image above is from a Taliban prisoner release in 2010.

The fact that the government appears to be embracing the United States policy of detaining people without trial is a cruel legacy.

“The use of the US system of detention without trial by the Afghan government is probably the most important consequence of the handover of Bagram. Yet it has been introduced with virtually no discussion, whether in parliament or the media. The Afghan government has appeared reluctant to discuss the issue: even as the new Afghan institutions were being established to detain Afghans without trial at Bagram, President Karzai’s spokesman told AAN they were against the practice. Kate Clark details what is now happening at Bagram, reveals unpublished documentation and questions whether the Afghan state has actually gained sovereignty over its detained citizens and whether the US has really relinquished any control.”

“The US was concerned about the possible release of some of those it deems the most dangerous people in custody, particularly as the 3000 odd people currently held by the US without trial might be considered illegally incarcerated under Afghan law. Hence the Afghan and US negotiators took recourse to the Laws of Armed Conflict. Both the Bagram MoU and the MoU on Special Operations, which was signed a month later (text and analysis are here), cite the 1977 Second Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions (APII) as the legal basis for detention without trial. APII acknowledges that when a state is fighting a war, it may deprive its citizens of ‘their liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict.’”

“If the Board recommends release, the case file is passed back to the Committee. However, the decision to release any detainee is made by the Bagram Transfer Commission, which is comprised of five ministers, under the chairmanship of the minister of defence. But even they cannot act independently. They must consult the US before releasing anyone, including those being sent for trial. The Bagram MoU says that if the US believes a particular individual remains a security threat, ‘Afghanistan is to consider favourably such assessment.’ This may be diplomatic language for a veto.”

Click here to read the full article.

Tags: bagram,

The Strategic Partnership | Documents, Analysis, Action

President Barack Obama and President Hamid Karzai emerge from their meeting before signing a strategic partnership agreement at the presidential palace in Kabul, Afghanistan, Wednesday, May 2, 2012. (AP Photo/Charles Dharapak)

Linked below are some of the documents released by the White House.

The Agreement covers a ten-year period with a comprehensive commitment to aid, economy, education, justice and war. However, because it is a framework, there is a lack of detail on all these matters.

One thing is clear.

The commitment to military aid and building-up the security forces is guaranteed. The commitment to aid, education and justice is a pledge to ask Congress to appropriate the funds.

Kate Clark, Afghanistan Analysts Network offers this

“4) This is not a status of forces agreement - or ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’ as it is termed in the Strategic Partnership Agreement. That should come, the Agreement says, in a year’s time. This is by far the more important issue, as the US needs its forces to continue to enjoy immunity from the Afghan justice system for any crimes they commit on Afghan soil. Sorting out this issue has been made more urgent after many Afghans, including parliamentarians, demanded that those responsible for the Panjway killing spree and the Quran burning at Bagram had to be tried in Afghan courts. Whether or not a status of forces agreement is signed will ultimately decide whether US forces can stay or, as in Iraq, go.

5) However, as it stands, Afghanistan agrees to provide US forces with continued access to and use of Afghan facilities to the end of 2014 and beyond (as it may be agreed in the ‘Bilateral Security Agreement’) for the purposes of, ‘combating al-Qaeda and its affiliates, training the ANSF and other mutually determined missions to advance shared security interests.’ Or as Obama put it in his speech: there will be ‘two narrow security missions beyond 2014: counter-terrorism and continued training.’ The aim, he says, is to destroy al-Qaida, not to build a country in America’s image. It seems then that the mission is not about nation building. Yet this is completely at odds with most of the Strategic Partnership Agreement which does very much focus on nation building and with an agenda which looks, despite its repeated commitments to internationally accepted norms, not much as that of the Afghan government in practice.”

Official Documents:

Enduring Strategic Partnership Agreement | Public Version

White House Fact Sheet on the Agreement

President’s Address to the Nation from Afghanistan


AFSC Response:

Newsletter: What will lead to a just and lasting peace in Afghanistan?

Our strategy is to challenge the media message with a public letter campaign, please help us. Click on the link to be directed to the action center.

Letter to the Editor

“After the President's speech Tuesday night, some might be under the impression that the war in Afghanistan is ending. On the contrary.

The plan that Mr. Obama announced just relies upon different military solutions, rather than peaceful alternatives for the Afghan people.

Under this plan Afghanistan will become a major non-NATO ally, subjecting the people of Afghanistan to yet another military alliance and continuing the last three decades of war and instability. The peace building necessary for a sovereign and stable Afghanistan cannot be carried out by the generals meeting later this month in Chicago for the NATO Summit.

Instead, we need to support a regional solution that doesn’t rely on force. Afghans don't want more wars and bigger armies. They want a settlement that heals a nation, instead of arming it. And so do many Americans.”

Talks Resume on Transit of War Supplies through Pakistan

Photo by Anjum Naveed (AP) Pakistani Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani (2nd Right) meeting with U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Marc Grossman (2nd left) in Islamabad on Thursday 26 April.


Marc Grossman is in Pakistan for the first time since US forces killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in a cross border attack last November. The US has been unwilling to suspend drone attacks into Pakistan, one of the key demands before ground transit of NATO and US war supplies to Afghanistan can resume.

AP reports on the meeting yesterday.

“He said he didn't expect to get an immediate commitment that the routes would reopen but that "the task now is to begin a conversation about how to move forward." Grossman also repeated earlier U.S. statements of regret but didn't apologize.

Washington wants the supply routes open before a May 20-21 summit of NATO leaders in Chicago.”

Here is a review of the Pakistani demands.

"After weeks of debate, the Parliament of Pakistan has unanimously endorsed a list of demands to guide discussions with the United States.

The paper, drafted by the national security service, is the latest step in redefining ground rules after 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by US airstrikes in a November cross border attack.

The result is a series of comprehensive demands, including an official apology for the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, an end to CIA drone strikes, and a ban on the transport of US/NATO weapons and ammunition thru Pakistan to the war in Afghanistan.

There is a prohibition on overt or covert military operations in the country, a ban on private contractors and a call on the government to pursue a natural gas pipeline with Iran.

This level of engagement by Parliament is really a demand for transparency. Claiming oversight responsibilities with the demand that no verbal agreements regarding national security be entered by the government.

If these demands are met, the US/NATO supply lines – for food and fuel – would be opened. The demands are non-binding and must be approved by senior US and Pakistani officials.”

Troops and Contractors in Afghanistan | March 2012

On Sunday it was announced that the United States and Afghanistan had agreed to the framework of a Strategic Partnership Agreement. The document has not been made public but we know it commits the United States to a lasting presence in Afghanistan through at least 2024.

In the U.S., it will by-pass congressional oversight and simply needs the signature of President Obama. In Afghanistan, Parliamentary hearings began on Monday but it is unclear whether or not they need to 'approve' the treaty or if it moves forward with the signature of President Karzai.

"What I understand is what it's like to be in a war zone and I understand the behavior in a war zone. And I would say that, first of all, that war is really an institution made up of criminal behavior. When we as civilians want to solve our problems, we're not allowed to murder people and burn their houses down. I don't see why war is an acceptable means of conflict resolution. And furthermore, the majority of people that die are innocent civilians." - Scott Camil, US Vietnam Veteran

According to the Brooking’s Afghanistan Index at the end of March there were 89,000 US troops in Afghanistan. The Department of Defense lists an addition 143,839 contractors.

89,000 – Troops Deployed (March 2012)
117,227 – Department of Defense (DoD) Contractors (March 2012)
26,612 – DoD Private Security – not USAID and State (March 2012)

Total – 232,839

Contractor numbers from CENTCOM Quarterly Contractor Census Report (DoD)
Number of US Troops from Afghanistan Index (Brookings Institution)

What Security Looks Like | Pakistan and the War

After weeks of debate, the Parliament of Pakistan has unanimously endorsed a list of demands to guide discussions with the United States.

The paper, drafted by the national security service, is the latest step in redefining ground rules after 24 Pakistani soldiers were killed by US airstrikes in a November cross border attack.

The result is a series of comprehensive demands, including an official apology for the killing of the Pakistani soldiers, an end to CIA drone strikes, and a ban on the transport of US/NATO weapons and ammunition thru Pakistan to the war in Afghanistan.

There is a prohibition on overt or covert military operations in the country, a ban on private contractors and a call on the government to pursue a natural gas pipeline with Iran.

This level of engagement by Parliament is really a demand for transparency. Claiming oversight responsibilities with the demand that no verbal agreements regarding national security be entered by the government.

If these demands are met, the US/NATO supply lines – for food and fuel – would be opened. The demands are non-binding and must be approved by senior US and Pakistani officials.

It is a positive sign. If only the US were as committed to diplomacy and dialogue as we are to supply lines. That map below illustrates the lengths the US and NATO have gone through to continue the war fighting.



Before the November attack, one-third of American war supplies moved through Pakistan, costing about $17 million a month. Since then, coalition forces have relied on the Northern Distribution Network, a system of supply lines in countries such as Russia, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, inflating supply costs by $87 million more per month, according to the Associated Press.

More links on Pakistan here.

What regional security looks like here.

What Does the New Agreement on Night Raids Mean?

The new agreement signed over the weekend between the US and Afghanistan establishes guidelines for the continuation of night raids by Special Forces. Follow the link for the full text.

The agreement sets out a new chain of command for ordering and conducting special operations. They must first be approved by a new all-Afghan body called the Afghan Operational Coordination Group (OCG), and then conducted by Afghan Forces, with support from US Forces in accordance with Afghan laws.

The US will continue to play a vital role.

Kate Clark with Afghanistan Analysts Network has the details. She focuses on the Afghan gains in control over night raids noting that it will put the government more at the forefront of the anti-Taliban struggle politically and militarily.

The embrace of this controversial program – and the associated targeted killings - is no victory for those calling for alternatives to violence. It does however offer hope that Afghans can hold their government responsible and accountable for future actions. It has proven impossible in the past to hold the international forces accountable for actions they see as part of war.

At the same time, she cautions that the agreement allows Afghan Special Forces to arrest people who can then be held without trial. The text of the agreement is included.

“The Afghan government is delighted with the MoU, rightly seeing it as a huge gain for Afghan sovereignty. President Karzai is now, at least nominally, in charge of one of the most politically and militarily significant and controversial aspects of the war and will probably continue to insist that US forces take a back seat. How far the Afghan government actually achieves sovereignty however remains to be seen: one can imagine ‘US support’, for example, meaning US forces and advisors remaining in de facto command, with Afghan colleagues being deferential to their wishes and expertise. However, the MoU does give Afghans the means to actually take some sort of command and control.

Along with security prisoners (which was the subject of an MoU which was signed last month), the contentious issue of night raids has been a major stumbling block to getting a strategic partnership deal between the two countries. To secure this MoU, the US has conceded a great deal, while Karzai has gained ground.

At the same time, from the international side, the agreement may help address the enduring complaint of the US and its allies that the president does not sufficiently ‘own’ the war: that he criticises his allies and international forces while occasionally speaking sympathetically about the Taleban, as if he sat above and outside the conflict. In the future, if civilians are killed in raids, or there is alleged theft of valuables or if homeowners feel dishonoured by fellow Afghans or their invited US allies, barging into their houses, it will now be his responsibility. He will no longer be able to behave as if this is a conflict he has no part in.”

Click here for the article link.

Tags: Night Raids

Near Agreement on Night Raids | Kill Capture Policy

AP is reporting that the U.S. is close to reaching its goals in advance of the NATO summit in Chicago.

“The United States and Afghanistan are close to an agreement over how to handle the hotly contested issue of night raids but still are at odds over how long coalition forces can detain prisoners, such as those captured during the operations, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday.

The agreement would call for the Afghans to take the lead in night operations and set up a timely, warrant-like judicial process for the raids. The official spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss sensitive negotiations.”

The agreement on prisoners last month and an imminent agreement on guidelines for night raids are seen as the cornerstones of a future US-Afghan strategic partnership. That agreement would spell out the legal basis of a long-term US military presence in Afghanistan beyond the 2014.

In May, more than 50 heads of state will meet at the NATO summit to discuss progress on ending the war, future strategy and support for a US-Afghan Strategic partnership. US Special Forces, bases, arms transfers, training and the funding of an Afghan security force are expected to form the basis of the partnership.

A bi-lateral agreement between occupier and occupied undercuts the critical need for a comprehensive regional solution, and the role of international law in providing the framework of a peace process.

The NYT focuses on the anger and distrust that the night raids have created among Afghan’s. Pointing out that the killing of 17 unarmed and sleeping people by a US soldiers is seen by many as a ‘night raid’.

"Finding a way to continue the raids is also considered essential for the post-2014 plan that is shaping up. The plan, in essence, envisions the United States’ leaving behind a small force that would focus on counterterrorism. For that kind of mission to work, the force would probably need to be able to carry out night raids."

Background:

On March 22 at hearing before the Senate Armed Service Committee, General Allen confirmed that in 2011 there had been 2,200 night raids. He states that of the total 9,200 night raids 27 people were killed or wounded.

“… This last year we had about 2,200 night operations. Of those 2,200 or so night operations, on 90 percent of them we didn't fire a shot. On more than 50 percent of them we got the targeted individual and 30 percent more we got the next associate of that individual as well. So 83 percent, roughly, of the night operations we got either the primary target or an associate."

"...But after 9,200 night operations, 27 -- 27 people were killed or wounded in night operations. That would argue for the power of night operations preserving life and reducing civilian casualties in all other kinds of operations, than necessarily being a risk of creating additional civilian casualties. That's in my mind, sir, as we go through the process of negotiating an outcome for the Afghanization, if you will, of night operations.

It’s an astonishing claim.

One that has been challenged by researchers with the Afghanistan Analysts Network who documented the impact of kill/capture campaigns using NATO own press releases. This is what they found.

The number of ‘leaders’ and ‘facilitators’ killed equals approximately 5% of the total deaths.

The number of ‘leaders’ and ‘facilitators’ detained equals approximately 13% of the total detentions.


Additional Resources:

Key Issues for Loya Jirga

Night Raids and Militia Forces

Summit for Peace and Economic Justice

Military Land Seizures Feed Resentment in Helmand

The Institute for War and Peace Reporting looks at the resentment brewing in Helmand province over the seizure of land and homes by Afghan and International Forces. Unlike night raids and other sensational abuses that receive media attention these actions ignite a slow burn. It’s what occupation looks like.

“Officials in Helmand province acknowledged there was a problem, although not all agreed on the scale of the home occupations or whether compensation was paid.

Helmand governor Mohammad Gulab Mangal said that he was aware of the issue and confirmed that both government units and NATO’s International Security Assistance Force, ISAF, made use of private property, including houses and farmlands.

“I have repeatedly told our police and army commanders to avoid damaging private property when they enter these areas, but there have been a number of cases where Afghan and ISAF forces have taken over and used people’s properties…”

Background:

Last year the US military commissioned a study on attitudes between US and Afghan soldiers. It reported that Afghan soldiers described their American comrades as rude, disrespectful and reckless with gunfire when civilians were nearby, while US troops saw Afghan personnel as traitorous, lazy, drug-addled and corrupt. It highlighted the deep divisions. A copy of the report is linked below.

In January the NYT’s ran excerpts of the report.

"The 70-page coalition report, titled “A Crisis of Trust and Cultural Incompatibility,” — which was originally distributed as an unclassified document and later changed to classified — goes far beyond anecdotes. It was conducted by a behavioral scientist who surveyed 613 Afghan soldiers and police officers, 215 American soldiers and 30 Afghan interpreters who worked for the Americans.
While the report focused on three areas of eastern Afghanistan, many of the Afghan soldiers interviewed had served elsewhere in Afghanistan and the author believed that they constituted a sample representative of the entire country.

“There are pervasive feelings of animosity and distrust A.N.S.F. personnel have towards U.S. forces,” the report said, using military’s abbreviation for Afghan security forces. The list of Afghan complaints against the Americans ran the gamut from the killing of civilians to urinating in public and cursing.

“U.S. soldiers don’t listen, they are too arrogant,” said one of the Afghan soldiers surveyed, according to the report. “They get upset due to their casualties, so they take it out on civilians during their searches,” said another.

The Americans were equally as scathing. “U.S. soldiers’ perceptions of A.N.A. members were extremely negative across categories,” the report found, using the initials for the Afghan National Army. Those categories included “trustworthiness on patrol,” “honesty and integrity,” and “drug abuse.” The Americans also voiced suspicions about the Afghans being in league with the Taliban, a problem well documented among the Afghan police.

“They are stoned all the time; some even while on patrol with us,” one soldier was quoted as saying. Another said, “They are pretty much gutless in combat; we do most of the fighting.”

A copy of the full report here.

tags: Afghan Voices, Strategic Partnership, Troop Levels

Talking about Talks | International Crisis Group

The International Crisis Group is a policy-oriented think tank focused on conflict and areas of conflict. This detailed report (51 pages) is hard-hitting and critical. What is missing is a focus on the role civil society should play in any comprehensive peace process and the influence of the US military.

You can find a good introduction here on the dangers of a US-Afghanistan strategic partnership here. And a good survey on the need to have civil society organizations involved in all aspects of negotiations here.



Talking about Talks: Toward a Political Settlement in Afghanistan

“No matter how much the U.S. and its NATO allies want to leave Afghanistan, it is unlikely that a Washington-brokered power-sharing agreement will hold long enough to ensure that the achievements of the last decade are not reversed. A lasting peace accord will ultimately require far more structured negotiations, under the imprimatur of the UN, than are presently being pursued. The Security Council should mandate Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to appoint a small team of mutually agreeable mediators as soon as possible to ensure that critical stakeholders are fully consulted and will remain engaged in the negotiations process.”

A History of Failure (excerpt)

“For 35 years, Afghanistan has been shaped by repeated failures to negotiate a sustainable political settlement. Each stage of the conflict, starting with the violent coup against Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan in 1978, has been capped by government programs to reconcile parties to the conflict. In each case, the attempt to broker a peace has suffered from intrinsic design flaws and lack of adequate support from the international community that has allowed external actors to undermine it. The root of these repeated failures lies primarily in confusion over the elements of reconciliation and disagreement over the desired end-state of a negotiated settlement. The successive rise and fall of Afghan governments – Daoud’s, the Soviet-backed People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), the mujahidin under Rabbani and the Taliban – also provided little room for manoeuvre, let alone sufficient time to carve out lasting compromises on the political and constitutional contours of the state.”

*****

“However, by September 1987, the Soviets delinked the issue of withdrawal from the shape of the future Afghan government and began bypassing the UN in favour of backchannel bilateral talks with the U.S. The tempo was dictated primarily by the ebb and flow of relations between the superpowers, but the focus was always on a formula for withdrawing Soviet troops and eliminating covert U.S. support for the mujahidin. Despite informal UN efforts to push parties to the conflict toward an agreement that also outlined the status of the government in Kabul following the withdrawal of foreign forces, the Afghan government essentially became a casualty of superpower politics and factional infighting among the seven main mujahidin parties. As agreement on the timetable for Soviet withdrawal began to take shape, political tensions between the mujahidin factions also emerged.”

Link to the full report
Link to Executive Summary and Recommendation

Week in Review | Pakistan

The Parliamentary Committee on National Security (PCNS) submitted their eagerly awaited report on Tuesday. The recommendations are to serve as the basis/framework for a formal review of relations with the United States.

The Parliamentary debate is scheduled to begin on Monday with a vote expected soon after on whether or not to accept the report.

The key recommendations are far reaching. An unconditional apology from the US over the cross border attack that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers in November, an end to drone strikes, no kill/capture campaigns by US forces in Pakistan, strong oversight of foreign security contractors and a tax on US/NATO war supplies going to Afghanistan.

If these demands are satisfied the land border-crossing for war supplies into Afghanistan would be re-opened.

The U.S. is currently paying more than “$500 million a year in transit fees to send military materiel through Central Asian states to Afghanistan.”

In the lead-up to the review, Sherry Rehman, Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington said “We want this relationship to be transparent and predictable…”

The NYT’s covered some of the initial reactions in Pakistan and notes that US sources have already said they will be willing to pay a tax of war supplies but were unwilling to end the CIA drone campaign.

“The recommendations are excellent,” said Imtiaz Safdar Warraich, a senior Pakistan Peoples Party lawmaker, outside Parliament. “Sovereignty and territorial integrity are the cornerstone of our foreign policy.”

Kamil Ali Agha, a senator from the Pakistan Muslim League-Q party, predicted a “very detailed and very lively” debate next week. “This is a very, very important issue for each and every Pakistani,” he said.

A resumption of full diplomatic relations with the Obama administration now looks unlikely before the middle of next month. American officials say they are ready to negotiate tariffs on NATO transit goods but will not consider an end to the C.I.A. drone campaign, which is viewed as a vital weapon against Al Qaeda and Taliban extremists operating from Pakistani soil.

Additional Resource:

For a good overview of the challenges faced in Pakistan listen to Terry Gross’ interview with Ahmed Rashid. He gives an eloquent defense of the need to engage with the Taliban as part of a political solution to the war. Also see this review of his new book.

Today, by the way is Pakistan day. A national holiday that celebrates the overthrow of colonial rule and the emergence of Pakistan as the world’s first Islamic republic in 1956.

Tags: Drone Strikes, Pakistan

U.S. Afghan Strategic Partnership on the Rocks

M K Bhadrakumar, a former diplomat from India, breaks down the motives on why the US is seeking to establish a bi-lateral agreement with the government of Afghanistan and abandon the constraints of a UN mandate. The second article, by the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers with Kathy Kelly, gives an on-the-ground perspective.

“The renewal of the mandate of the ISAF - multinational force leading the campaign in Afghanistan - comes up for renewal in the UN Security Council this week. The ensuing debate can be expected to bring into focus the issues of the proposed ‘transition’ in 2013, the ending of the ‘combat mission’ in 2014 and the post-2014 scenario itself. I am keenly awaiting the Indian statement.

The United States and NATO are hoping to change ships — move out of the UN mandate to a more comfortable bilateral framework with the government in Kabul so that they are not accountable to the UN and can pursue their geo-strategies in the region with impunity. The US and NATO’s expectation is to formalize a long-term military presence in the region. Simultaneously, NATO is also probing the scope for expanding its presence in Central Asia.

But the best-laid plans can go awry in Afghanistan. The present moment is one such, full of imponderables. A new, unexpected and yet compelling factor has surged, which was always there lurking below the surface but the US found it expedient to ignore — Afghan nationalism. After having taken decades of battering and with its economy in shambles, somehow a notion had crept in the Western mind that the Afghans are up for sale to the highest bidder…”

Read full blog here.


Debating the U.S. Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement

“Currently, citizens of Syria and the world can at least discuss Mr Kofi Annan’s warning that the situation in Syria should be handled “very, very carefully” to avoid an escalation that would de-stabilize the region, after an earlier warning against further militarization of the Syrian crisis. The crisis in Afghanistan is as severe as the one in Syria, and it is more chronic. 2 million Afghans have been killed in the wars of the past 4 decades. But not a single diplomat is warning against the further militarization of the Afghan crisis.

The previous UN Envoy to Afghanistan, Kai Eide, did try. “The most important reason for my bitterness was my ever-growing disagreement with Washington’s strategy in Afghanistan,” Kai Eide writes, in his book Power Struggle over Afghanistan. “It had become increasingly dominated by military strategies, forces, and offensives. Urgent civilian and political requirements were treated as appendices to the military tasks. The UN had never been really involved or consulted by Washington on critical strategy-related questions, nor had even the closest NATO partners. More importantly, Afghan authorities had mostly been spectators to the formation of a strategy aimed at solving the conflict in their own country.

It has taken the killing of 16 civilians in Kandahar for the world to notice the anger that the war has inflamed in the hearts of both U.S. soldiers and Afghan mothers.

Military and foreign policy elites in Washington have encouraged a conventional presumption that the ‘war on terror’ requires a long-term U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. Underlying that presumption is a deeper assumption that ‘terrorism’ can be resolved through war, that is, a supposition that humanity can somehow counter ‘terrorism’ by killing as many ‘terrorists’ as possible, regardless of the deadly anger these killings, so similar in themselves to terrorist acts, must necessarily fuel, not to mention the costly ‘collateral damage.’

Tax-payers from the 50 coalition countries involved in the Afghan war should be alarmed at how and where their money is spent. They should be considering how they would feel were they offered $2000 in compensation for the murder of a child, husband, father or mother, the compensation NATO handed out ‘ex-gratia’ (with no admission of its own wrongdoing) to the families of the 16 children, women and men slaughtered in their sleep on March 11, 2012.

Will the Afghan Parliament, the U.S. public or the UN debate the 10 year U.S. war strategy in Afghanistan?

Will the Afghan Parliament, the U.S. public or the UN debate the U.S. Afghan Strategic Partnership Agreement?...”

Read full article here.

The Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers are a grassroots group of multi-ethnic, ordinary Afghans working towards non-military solutions for Afghanistan, based on non-violence, unity, equality and self-reliance. http://ourjourneytosmile.com and http://globaldaysoflistening.org.


Additional Links:

Loya Jirga to Approve Long-Term US Military Presence

Tags: Strategic Partnership

Taliban Suspend Talks | Karzai Demands US Back to Bases

The decision by the Taliban to suspend talks, and the demand by President Karzai that all US and NATO troops leave the village-centered forward-operating bases, are fundamental rejections of current US policy.

The murder last weekend of 16 Afghan civilians by a US soldier is being used by President Karzai to demand (once again) that US and NATO forces vacate the forward-operating bases scattered across the country. These bases are the launch pads for kill/capture operations and night raids that have angered Afghans across the country.

The map above does not show all the bases that the US and NATO have in the country but it gives a sense. Last week Nick Turse documented the real number as more than 450.

In early 2010, the U.S.-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) had nearly 400 bases in Afghanistan. Today, Lieutenant Lauren Rago of ISAF public affairs tells TomDispatch, the number tops 450.

Kate Clark has an analysis of the Taliban statement released yesterday. It should be no surprise that the presence of foreign troops it at the core of their demands.

‘… the Afghan issue has two main dimensions; one is internal and the other external… Until and unless the external dimension is settled which rests entirely in the hands of the foreigners, discussing the internal dimension is meaningless and is nothing more than a waste of time. Therefore the Islamic Emirate considers talking with the Kabul administration as pointless.’ - Taliban Statement

Taliban Suspend Talks

“There has been a worrying lack of urgency from the Americans about the opportunity for talks provided by the Taleban’s opening on 3 January of a political office in Qatar. The move, which necessarily had been approved by Washington, was proof of some political courage by both sides, something tangible emerging from their months’ long dance of comments which had appeared aimed at somehow encouraging the other or mitigating their fears (for detail, see AAN blog). However, the timing of the Qatar office opening was always going to be tricky. Early January did not give much time to come up with something more solid before the Taleban had to either decide to keep talking or start rousing the rank and file to go back into battle after their winter rest.

The Taleban have now suspended the political process unilaterally. The statement, unusually for the Taleban holds back on the rhetoric and insults and instead concentrates quite soberly on making political points. They said the US envoy in his latest meeting presented new conditions which contradicted an already agreed memorandum of understanding. The Americans, were they said, ‘wasting time’. (The full text of the Taleban statement can be seen at the end of this piece).

The statement says the ‘diplomatic office in Qatar was opened with the purpose of ‘reaching an understanding with the international community’ and of ‘addressing some specific issues with the American invaders.’ It said the Taleban wanted to be able to have face-to-face dialogue in ‘complete freedom’ and ‘away from danger’ and to silence critics who said the Taleban had no address (where they could be spoken to) or was just a ‘warring faction’ which had no political or administrative capacities and wanted to harm other nations. To this end, the statement said, they ‘started holding preliminary talks with the occupying enemy.’

***

Ahmad Rashid writing earlier this week in the financial times raised the same point. Arguing that the Government of Afghanistan can’t seek a long-term US military presence and peace with the Taliban.

“The Afghan president’s desire to seek a strategic partnership agreement with the US is becoming more and more unacceptable to the Afghan people. At the same time he also wants to make peace with the Taliban, but they have no desire for a pact with Washington. His dilemma, which he still refuses to understand, is that he can either ask for a long-term US presence or peace with the Taliban, but not both.”

It is based on this fact.

“Increasing numbers of Afghans would agree with what the Taliban have been arguing for almost a decade: that the western presence in Afghanistan is prolonging the war, causing misery and bloodshed.”

He ends with the challenges ahead.

“After the spate of incidents this year, there should be no doubt in Washington that seeking a negotiated settlement to end the war with the Taliban as quickly as possible is the only way out. Mr Obama has to put his weight behind this strategy to ensure an orderly withdrawal and to give the Afghan people the chance of an end to this war. A power-sharing formula with the Taliban, which now appears increasingly unavoidable, and an accord with neighbouring states to limit their interference, will be key.

In 1989 it was America and Pakistan who refused to allow a political solution to end the fighting because they wanted not just the Soviets gone but also Moscow’s Afghan protégées led by Mohammad Najibullah. Instead he hung on for three years, resulting in a civil war. America cannot again leave Afghanistan with a civil war as its bequest to the Afghans. Washington, and Nato, must seek an end to the war before withdrawing their forces. Despite the tragic death of so many innocent children, this is still possible if there is a concerted diplomatic and political push.”

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Additional analysis: Taliban

CIA Drone Strikes Kill 15 in Waziristan

Reuters is reporting that two separate CIA drone strikes in Waziristan left 15 dead this morning.

"In the first strike, a drone fired missiles at a vehicle in the Birmal area of the South Waziristan tribal region, killing eight."

"Seven were killed in the second attack later in the day, when a drone fired missiles at a vehicle in the Sara Khawra area, which straddles the border between North Waziristan and South Waziristan."

Earlier in the week Bloomberg reported that the Government of Pakistan again sought to end the CIA program through high level meetings in Washington.

“Pakistan’s ambassador to Washington, Sherry Rehman, met Vice President Joe Biden’s national security adviser Antony Blinken on March 9 and told him that Pakistan’s political parties have agreed that the drone flights over Pakistan must end, officials involved said, speaking on condition of anonymity because the talks were private.”

Last month Pakistan's Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar said.

"Drones are not only completely illegal and unlawful and have no authorization to be used within the domains of international law but even more importantly, they are counter-productive to the objective of getting this region rid of militancy, and terrorism and extremism."

Ahmed Rashid writing in today’s financial times gets to the core of the issue; arguing that the Government of Afghanistan can’t seek a long-term US military presence and peace with the Taliban.

“The Afghan president’s desire to seek a strategic partnership agreement with the US is becoming more and more unacceptable to the Afghan people. At the same time he also wants to make peace with the Taliban, but they have no desire for a pact with Washington. His dilemma, which he still refuses to understand, is that he can either ask for a long-term US presence or peace with the Taliban, but not both.”

It is based on this fact.

“Increasing numbers of Afghans would agree with what the Taliban have been arguing for almost a decade: that the western presence in Afghanistan is prolonging the war, causing misery and bloodshed.”

He ends with the challenges ahead.

“After the spate of incidents this year, there should be no doubt in Washington that seeking a negotiated settlement to end the war with the Taliban as quickly as possible is the only way out. Mr Obama has to put his weight behind this strategy to ensure an orderly withdrawal and to give the Afghan people the chance of an end to this war. A power-sharing formula with the Taliban, which now appears increasingly unavoidable, and an accord with neighbouring states to limit their interference, will be key.

In 1989 it was America and Pakistan who refused to allow a political solution to end the fighting because they wanted not just the Soviets gone but also Moscow’s Afghan protégées led by Mohammad Najibullah. Instead he hung on for three years, resulting in a civil war. America cannot again leave Afghanistan with a civil war as its bequest to the Afghans. Washington, and Nato, must seek an end to the war before withdrawing their forces. Despite the tragic death of so many innocent children, this is still possible if there is a concerted diplomatic and political push.”

US Military to Transfer Control of Largest Prison to Afghans

AP has the details on the last minute deal to gradually turn over US held prisoners at Parwan detention center to Afghan control. Parwan is the largest US run prison in the country and the site where religious items, including Quran’s, were destroyed last month.

U.S. and Afghan officials have said this is a major step towards a strategic partnership agreement that would outline the legal status of US military forces beyond 2014. The governments want the agreement before the May NATO summit in Chicago.

The deal will allow the US military to monitor operations and continue to “provide logistical support for 12 months, and a joint U.S.-Afghan commission will decide on any detainee releases until a more permanent pact is adopted, according to U.S. officials involved in the negotiations — a setup that will essentially give U.S. officials power to veto any release.”

In addition.

“The U.S. also operates what it has described as temporary holding pens for gathering intelligence from detainees in Afghanistan; officials have confirmed anonymously that some detainees have been held at these centers for up to nine weeks. The agreement does not appear to address these sites.”

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“KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — The U.S. military and the Afghan government sealed an agreement Friday on the gradual transfer of control of the main U.S. prison in the country, a last-minute breakthrough that brings the first progress in months in contentious negotiations over a long-term partnership.

The compromise deal came on the day Afghan President Hamid Karzai had set as a deadline for the Americans to hand over the Parwan prison.

The agreement gives the U.S. six months to transfer Parwan's 3,000 Afghan detainees to Afghan control. However, the U.S. will also be able to block the release of prisoners, easing American fears that insurgents or members of the Taliban could be freed and return to the fight.

The deal removes a sticking point that had threatened to derail talks that have been going on for months that would formalize the U.S.-Afghan partnership and the role of U.S. forces in Afghanistan after NATO's scheduled transfer of security responsibility to the Afghan government at the end of 2014.

On Thursday, U.S. President Barack Obama and Karzai discussed the stalled security pact talks in a video conference. White House press secretary Jay Carney said the two leaders noted progress toward completing an agreement "that reinforces Afghan sovereignty while addressing the practical requirements of transition."

Another major sticking point in the negotiations remains unresolved: night raids by international troops on the homes of suspected militants. Karzai has demanded a halt to the raids, which have caused widespread anger among Afghans.

U.S. and Afghan officials have said that they want a strategic partnership agreement signed by the time a NATO summit convenes in Chicago in May.”

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“The deal gives the Americans the extension they wanted for Parwan, a U.S.-run prison adjoining its Bagram military base north of Kabul, but also spells out an American commitment to a firm transfer date for the first time. Previously, the U.S. has always offered "target dates" rather than deadlines.

Under the deal, an Afghan general will be put in charge of Parwan within days, but the Americans have a six-month window to transfer detainees to Afghan oversight, according to presidential spokesman Aimal Faizi.

The U.S. military will still be able to monitor operations. It will continue to provide logistical support for 12 months, and a joint U.S.-Afghan commission will decide on any detainee releases until a more permanent pact is adopted, according to U.S. officials involved in the negotiations — a setup that will essentially give U.S. officials power to veto any release. The Afghans also have agreed to grant human rights groups regular access to detainees. Last year, the United Nations found evidence of torture at a number of Afghan-run prisons.

The officials, who spoke anonymously to discuss confidential talks ahead of the signing, said the first 500 detainees are expected to be transferred in 45 days. The U.S. government had already handed over a few hundred detainees to the Afghans before the agreement was signed.

The officials said the deal does not apply to the approximately 50 non-Afghans at Parwan, who will remain in U.S. custody.

The officials also said that they still need to work out how to handle new detainees. Currently, the U.S. military assesses whether people captured on the battlefield are a threat and then either lets them go, hands them over to Afghan authorities or sends them to Parwan.

The U.S. also operates what it has described as temporary holding pens for gathering intelligence from detainees in Afghanistan; officials have confirmed anonymously that some detainees have been held at these centers for up to nine weeks. The agreement does not appear to address these sites.”

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“The U.S.-Afghan strategic partnership is expected to provide for several thousand U.S. troops to stay and train Afghan forces and help with counterterrorism operations. It would outline the legal status of those forces, their operating rules and where they would be based.

The agreement is also seen as a means of assuring the Afghan people that the U.S. does not plan to abandon their country, even as it withdraws its combat forces.”

Additional Resources:

The ICRC in Afghanistan

The ICRC has been visiting detainees at the Detention Facility in Parwan (DFIP, formerly the Bagram Theater Internment Facility), located on a US military airbase north of Kabul, since January 2002, three months after the conflict in Afghanistan began in October 2001. As of the end of 2011, the ICRC had carried out a total of 160 visits at the detention facility. Of the approximately 3,000 detainees currently held there, most are Afghans captured by the US-led coalition in southern and eastern Afghanistan. Since the beginning of 2008, the ICRC has also had access to detainees at several US-run field detention sites in Afghanistan where they are held temporarily before being released or transferred to the DFIP.

As part of a planned gradual decrease in the US military presence in Afghanistan from 2011, the DFIP and many of the persons held there are to be transferred over time to the Afghan government authorities. The ICRC maintains a constructive dialogue with the US and Afghan government authorities on how to conduct this transfer process in a way that reflects humanitarian concerns, respects detainee rights and adequately prepares the Afghan judicial and penitentiary authorities for handling the additional detainee population.

Caravan of Nonviolence to Jalalabad | AYPF Profile

On Sunday the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers began a Caravan of Nonviolence to Jalalabad. A city of the Mughal Empire previously known as Adinapour.

On Saturday there will be a unique Global Day of Listening call with students from the U.S.



Here is the announcement they sent to supporters

“As we set off on the road with a niggling worry, we wondered as usual, “Is non-violence possible in Afghanistan?”

But then, that is like asking, “Is love possible in Afghanistan?”

Or like asking, “Are Afghan mothers really human beings capable of love?”

Or, as in this video clip of our Caravan, “Do Afghan mothers wish the same for their children?”

Jalalabad is where young people took to the streets peacefully to protest the US Afghanistan Strategic Partnership dealings and where much good exists despite foreign intervention.

As our host and friend in Jalalabad, Hameed Tasal, would say, “Come to Jalala-good!”

Love,

Hakim and the Afghan Youth Peace Volunteers”

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Additional Resource: Global Day of Listening | 9 March | Jalalabad

SPECIAL Afghan Conversation with AYPVs from Jalalabad:
Students in USA on March 9 ~ 10:30 am EST

Second CIA Drone Strike in 48 hours Kills 6 | Pakistan

A second CIA drone strike has killed 6 people in North Waziristan. The targeted assassinations took place in the same region as yesterday’s strike. An attack that formally recommitted the US to the deadly drone war in Pakistan.

The resumption of the strikes coincide with Pakistan’s firing of the defense secretary over a memo sent to the Unites States offering new security guidelines. It is a dangerous political moment for the Government of Pakistan.

AP reports:

“Pakistan’s prime minister fired the defense secretary Wednesday in a dispute over a memo sent to Washington that has enraged the army, escalating a crisis pitting the civilian government against the powerful military leadership.”

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“The unsigned memo sent to Washington asks for its help in reining in the power of the military in exchange for favorable security policies. It was allegedly masterminded by Pakistan’ envoy to Washington, who resigned in a failed attempt to stem the fallout.”

The resumption also comes on the heels of the new US defense strategy announced by President Obama last week.

That strategy calls for fewer wars like Iraq, and more wars like Afghanistan where war-fighting coordination between the Pentagon, now run by former CIA chief Leon Panetta and the CIA now run by the former US commander in Afghanistan General Petraeus is the model.

As C.I.A. director Mr. Panetta transformed the spy agency into a paramilitary organization, with its drone attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as secret bases and covert operations. General Petraeus increased the use of Special Forces and private security contractors to conduct secret intelligence missions and armed and financed militia forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The Guidance envisions more of this in the future.

Additional Resources:
How the CIA became a Killing Machine

Details on the Afghan-Indian Strategic Agreement

The India-Afghanistan strategic agreement will have major implications for the region. The deal, made public earlier this month, precedes an anticipated US-Afghan strategic agreement that is expected to include a long-term US troop presence. The US will also likely pledge to cover the expenses of a large standing army that the Government of Afghanistan can't possibly meet.

Last week Secretary of State Hilary Clinton told a congressional hearing that 90% of the US-Afghan Agreement is complete. The outstanding issues are critical and include troop levels, weapons transfers and training. The Government of Afghanistan will be hosting a Loya Jirga in the coming weeks to try and get approval for these controversial issues.

Afghan-Indian agreement heralds a strategic shift in the region
CJ Radin, Long War Journal, 31 October

"Signaling a shift in policy, Afghanistan and India have signed a strategic partnership agreement. Afghan President Hamid Karzai and Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh signed the document, which includes provisions for both security and economic cooperation, earlier this month in New Delhi. This is the first time Afghanistan has made such an agreement with any country, at least since 1979.

The document has three notable provisions.

First, India will help train Afghan National Security Forces. India will train and mentor Afghan army and police personnel in Afghanistan, and Afghans will attend training academies in India. India will also assist in equipping the Afghan forces. The agreement does not include any deployment of Indian combat troops to Afghanistan. Both countries already share intelligence information.

Second, India will furnish Afghanistan with economic aid and assistance. The agreement provides an additional $500 million on top of the $1 billion India has already spent since 2002. In addition, India and Afghanistan will cooperate in the development of mining and energy production.

Third, Afghanistan and India will establish a strategic dialogue between their respective national security advisers "to provide a framework for cooperation in the area of national security."

The agreement leaves open the possibility of even closer ties in the future. The Indian prime minister has said that India will support Afghanistan as it assumes the responsibility of governance and security after the withdrawal of international forces.

Strategic significance

This agreement signals a shift in policy for Afghanistan and India. Up until now, India has played a very limited role in Afghanistan in spite of India's national interest in the country. This has been largely due to Pakistani sensitivity to the issue of Indian presence in Afghanistan. Significant Indian involvement in Afghanistan has been seen by Pakistan as a threat, an attempt by India to encircle Pakistan. Accordingly, the US and Afghanistan have sought to maintain relations with Pakistan, even if it meant keeping Indian relations at arm's length.

The new pact indicates that Afghanistan's strategic calculation has changed. Maintaining a relationship with Pakistan is no longer the top priority, and Indian support for Afghan development is now a higher priority. This does not mean, however, that India and Afghanistan have decided to disregard their relationships with Pakistan entirely. Both Afghanistan and India have attempted to reassure Pakistan in the wake of the agreement. Speaking in New Delhi, President Karzai said:

Pakistan is our twin brother, India is a great friend. The agreement we signed with our friend will not affect our brother ....This strategic partnership ... is not directed against any country ... this strategic partnership is to support Afghanistan.

Similarly, the Indian prime minister said after announcing the agreement: "Our cooperation with Afghanistan is an open book.""

Loya Jirga to Approve Long-Term US Military Presence

The Afghan government has announced that a Loya Jirga will convene in November to try reach unity on a new security agreement that would allow a long-term U.S. military presence in the country beyond 2014. A key issue will be the legal framework. Much will hinge of the level of immunity the Afghan government will allow to the foreign troops and contractors.

The proposed agreement has been drafted over many months by representatives of the U.S. and Afghan governments.

The United National Front a newly formed Afghan political group is pushing back. Calling for the removal of all foreign forces.

"Experience has shown us that foreign forces cannot bring peace to Afghanistan. We will have peace when we remove the causes of conflict among [Afghan] people," Mozhdah said. "One of the key reasons for fighting here is that we don't trust each other. We need to sit and talk to each other to gain each others trust."

Abubakar Siddique has the story. Entitled Afghan Opposition Grows to Next Stage of U.S. Military Presence.

"The opposition to the draft agreement also reached the halls of parliament, where the issue was discussed this week. The next stage for the debate is a loya jirga, or national council, whose date was announced this week and is intended to help determine a course of action.

The traditional gathering, set to begin on November 16, will provide a setting for more than 2,000 Afghan politicians, tribal leaders, clerics, and lawmakers to debate over a four-day period.

The 2005 security agreement signed by Kabul and Washington pledged U.S. cooperation for democracy building, improved governance, and economic and security cooperation. The new agreement focuses on the U.S. military role in the country after 2014, when most NATO combat operations are expected to be over.

Specific details are unavailable, but Afghan officials reportedly say the new agreement would likely give the government greater control over foreign aid and military operations while allowing a long-term U.S. presence in the country.

Afghan officials have also suggested in local media that some of their key demands, such as an end to night raids by foreign forces and mechanisms to protect Afghan civilians, are likely to be part of the final agreement.

In Afghanistan's Interests

These are among the most divisive issues within the Afghan government in its dealings with the United States, according to lawmaker Gul Badshah Majidi. He says that lawmakers on October 24 rejected a 2002 agreement with the International Security Assistance Force that allowed them to freely conduct military operations across Afghanistan. This, he says, indicates opposition to the new strategic agreement, which was also opposed by some lawmakers in recent debates.

Majidi says that the government needs to launch a robust information campaign to convince Afghans that the new agreement is different from the past agreements. And that it will actually serve Afghanistan's national interests. He says that the issue comes up in discussions with his constituents in southeastern Paktia Province who express pessimism over the deal.

But he says that they often change their views after learning more about the nature of the agreement. "I think the ultimate decision about the agreement will entail a legal framework for the presence of these forces. Their presence is needed in Afghanistan and it will serve Afghanistan's national interests," Majidi says. "The people of Afghanistan are still concerned about the return of the Taliban. They are also worried about an occupation by the Pakistan-based [fundamentalist] militias."

Afghan officials expect to host 2,030 people in the November loya jirga. They plan on briefing participants on the draft agreement before the assembly formally opens on November 16.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai recently indicated that the draft agreement agreed by the traditional leadership council will be sent to the parliament for final approval."